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INTRODUCTION
Like many fish, sharks are facing unprecedented overfishing. They have
been targeted both directly for their fins and caught accidentally (bycaught)
in, for instance, tuna fisheries. This has led to collapsing stocks around the
world.' Overfishing has led to what has been termed a mass extinction
among ocean species,2 and sharks are no exception-they are in fact espe-
cially vulnerable. As a result, many species of sharks are now listed on the
Red List of the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN).
3
This problem can only be tackled through coordinated, cooperative ac-
tion by all states. This Note explores one avenue through which states can
cooperate: Regional Fisheries Management Organizations, or RFMOs. Alt-
hough RFMOs have many members, this Note will focus on the United
States and the European Union. Both are major powers and participants in
many of the world's RFMOs,4 and both have the potential to strongly impact
shark conservation. The United States is particularly relevant as it has juris-
diction over a larger area of the world's oceans than any other nation, and
thus can more effectively implement and complement the RFMOs' ocean
I. See, e.g., Nicholas K. Dulvy et al., You Can Swim but You Can't Hide: The Global
Status and Conservation of Oceanic Pelagic Sharks and Rays, 18 AQUATIC CONSERVATION:
MARINE & FRESHWATER ECOSYSTEMS 459, 471 (2008) (finding sixteen out of twenty-one
elasmobranchs surveyed, including several sharks, to be endangered); see also Mark D. Evans,
Comment, Shark Conservation: The Need for Increased Efforts to Protect Shark Populations
in the Twenty-First Century, 10 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 13, 14 (2001) (noting that "many
shark species have been and are being depleted at alarming rates").
2. John C. Kunich, Losing Nemo: The Mass Extinction Now Threatening the World's
Ocean Hotspots, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 4 (2005) ("Mass extinction has left emptiness in
the once crowded waters."). For more recent literature, see, for example, SHARKS OF THE
OPEN OCEAN: BIOLOGY, FISHERIES AND CONSERVATION, at xxxii-xxxiii (Merry D. Camhi et
al. eds., 2008).
3. The IUCN Red List of Threatened Species, INT'L UNION FOR CONSERVATION OF
NATURE [IUCN], http://www.iucnredlist.org (last visited Jan. 25, 2012). The list, updated
several times a year, lists all known species and whether their population status is of concern.
A search for the keyword shark shows that many are vulnerable or near threatened, with a
decreasing population trend.
4. They are both members of the four RFMOs surveyed here, infra Part II.B, and of




conservation efforts through domestic legislation.5 Because many sharks are
highly migratory species and travel readily between national waters and the
high seas,6 unilateral policy making can only be of limited effect; the United
States, the European Union (E.U.), and every other nation must cooperate
within RFMOs and other relevant international organizations to protect the-
se species.
International law is an important tool in fostering international coopera-
tion, especially when states must share living resources such as migratory
species.7 Sharks fall under several international regimes, 8 including the in-
ternational fisheries regime. The most important development in the
international fisheries regime has been the establishment of the regional
fisheries organizations that feature prominently in this Note. 9 This Note thus
focuses on several Atlantic and Pacific Ocean regional organizations and
their institutional frameworks, particularly those covering the U.S. exclusive
economic zone (EEZ).10 While these organizations have the potential to
have a significant positive impact on shark conservation, improvement of
the institutions themselves-and of the fisheries regime at large-are neces-
sary to realize such an impact.
Part I discusses some important background issues, including the rea-
sons why sharks should be protected, the particular problems facing sharks,
and unilateral steps the United States has already taken to protect them. Part
II reviews how international law is relevant to shark conservation, and which
regimes provide options to promote conservation. Part III analyzes the fish-
eries regime more specifically, examining the role RFMOs play and the
interactions between international and domestic fisheries laws. This analysis
shows that while fisheries organizations have taken some steps towards
5. See Mary Turnipseed et al., The Silver Anniversary of the United States' Exclusive
Economic Zone: Twenty-Five Years of Ocean Use and Abuse, and the Possibility of a Blue
Water Public Trust Doctrine, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 3, 34 (2009).
6. See ANA BARREIRA, THE PROTECTION OF SHARKS: A LEGAL AND POLICY ANALYSIS
11-12 (2007), available at http://www.iidma.org/privado/Archivos/ReportSharksApril2007.pdf.
7. States have recognized this. For instance, it has been noted in the preamble of an
important migratory species conservation treaty that "conservation and effective management
of migratory species of wild animals require the concerted action of all [range states]." Con-
vention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals pmbl., June 23, 1979,
1651 U.N.T.S. 356 [hereinafter CMS].
8. International environmental regime theory, as explained by PATRICIA B1RNIE ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 84-98 (3d ed. 2009), provides some back-
ground to the realities of international regimes such as the fisheries regime. Important regimes
for sharks include the wildlife conservation regime and, since shark fins are traded worldwide,
the world trade regime. See infra Part IlB.
9. See BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 8, at 711-14. Highly migratory species, including
sharks, were considered to be an important category of species requiring management. See id.
at 722 (noting that several shark species are included on Annex I of the U.N. Convention on
the Law of the Sea).
10. The EEZ is the part of the ocean extending up to 200 nautical miles off a state's
coast, over which a state has exclusive jurisdiction in respect to natural resources, including
fish. See infra note 150 and accompanying text.
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improved shark management, much more work is needed. This Note con-
cludes that RFMOs have the potential to impact shark conservation
positively if states push for increased shark management within these organ-
izations. Additionally, major nations can back up the international regimes
with strong domestic conservation measures to ensure that sharks are con-
served for future generations.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Reasons to Protect Sharks1"
There are many reasons to protect sharks, but they can be divided into
roughly four categories: present practical value, potential future value, in-
tangible value, and moral duty. 2
Sharks are resources of high value to any country. They are sought after
in international trade as food13 and are used in medical and other research.
14
Valuable shark tourism, including viewing and recreationally fishing for
sharks, is increasing.15 Discovery Channel's Shark Week is watched by mil-
1I. The analysis in this Section is based on John Charles Kunich, The Fallacy of
Deathbed Conservation Under the Endangered Species Act, 24 ENVTL. L. 501, 522-28
(1994).
12. Id. While most authors do not use such a formal framework to analyze conservation
problems, it is a useful way to categorize the various reasons for shark conservation, and it
may be a useful tool for policy making. See Gregory N. Mandel, Toward a Better Deci-
sionmaking Process: Finding the Truth in Policy and Removing False Science, 15 TEMP.
ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 65, 73-74 (1996) (arguing that good policy making should include
consideration of all four of the values that Kunich mentions, since they reflect a variety of
important values beyond science and economics).
13. Shark flesh and especially shark fins, for the well-known shark fin soup, have be-
come more valuable as other fisheries have declined in yield. Merry D. Camhi et al., A Global
Overview of Commercial Fisheries for Open Ocean Sharks, in SHARKS OF THE OPEN OCEAN:
BIOLOGY, FISHERIES AND CONSERVATION, supra note 2, at 166, 167. While the United States is
by no means the biggest shark trading country in the world, trade in sharks and shark parts is
worth several millions of U.S. dollars each year. See NAT'L MARINE FISHERIES SERV.
[NMFS], FINAL AMENDMENT 3 TO THE CONSOLIDATED ATLANTIC HIGHLY MIGRATORY SPE-
CIES FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN 3-94 to -95 (2010) [hereinafter AMENDMENT 3], available
at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/hms/FMP/AM3_FEIS/TotalA3-FEIS.pdf.
14. Fifteen years ago, scientists had just started to discover that a shark "has an arsenal
of molecules (and functions) in its immune system." Martin F. Flajnik, The Immune System of
Ectothermic Vertebrates, 54 VETERINARY IMMUNOLOGY & IMMUNOPATHOLOGY 145, 147
(1996). Researchers are now finding ways to use shark immunology to fight disease, and use
unique shark proteins for a wide variety of applications, including biowarfare agents or pollu-
tion detectors. Sharks Could Save Lives, ECOS MAG., Nov.-DEc. 2004, at 35, available at
http://www.ecosmagazine.com.au/?act=viewfile&file-id=ECI 22p35.pdf.
15. Rick Gaffney, Tourism and Jaws, Pac. Fisheries Coal. Shark Conference 2000,
Honolulu, Haw., Feb. 21-24, 2000 (Online Documents), http://www.pacfish.org/sharkcon/
documents/gaffneyr.html (listing several popular places for shark game fishing and watching
in the United States). In 2010, the Maldives and Palau closed their shark fisheries entirely as
sharks were worth more for tourists than when caught. Matthew 0. Berger, U.S. Finning Ban
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lions of people every year.'6 A study in Palau recently found that a live
shark's value as a tourist attraction can be nearly $2 million. 7 Severe deple-
tion or extinction would shut the door on these varied uses of sharks and
prevent discovery of any other uses sharks might have. 8 Furthermore,
sharks as apex predators play an important role in preserving marine ecosys-
tem balance. 19 This gives them present practical value, and, for instance, as
medical research continues, we discover that sharks hold much potential
future value as well.
Unsustainable fisheries have cost the world about $2.2 trillion over three
decades-about $50 billion in 2004 alone. 20 Individual nations may be par-
ticularly affected if their waters contain many sharks. For instance, since the
United States has the largest EEZ in the world,2' it stands to lose much if
unsustainable fishing of valuable resources such as sharks continues, both in
its own waters and in adjacent international waters.
22
Beyond these economic reasons to preserve sharks, a sense of religious
or moral duty to preserve sharks-often called stewardship--could play a
role for some people in deciding conservation is important.23 The destruc-
tion of "our fellow passengers on this planet" is something that many people
oppose on ethical grounds, even though it might make short-term economic
sense to hunt a species to extinction.24 Similarly, the intangible aesthetic
Caps Busy Year for Shark Conservation, IPS NEWS, Dec. 22, 2010, available at http://www.
ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=53936.
16. James Hibbard, Discovery's Shark Week Gets Strong Start, REUTERS, Aug. 4, 2010,
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6740CE20100805.
17. David Jolly, Priced Off the Menu? Palau's Sharks Are Worth $1.9 Million Each, a
Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/02/sciencelearth/
02shark.html?_r=-l.
18. See Kunich, supra note 11, at 527 ("Extinction shuts doors and deprives us forever
of the option to discover value in that which we previously found valueless.").
19. RACHEL CUNNINGHAM-DAY, SHARKS IN DANGER: GLOBAL SHARK CONSERVATION
STATUS WITH REFERENCE TO MANAGEMENT PLANS AND LEGISLATION 15 (2001); see also
Patrick Goddard, Sharks: The Ocean's Oldest Predators, ENVTL. GRAFFITI, http://www.
environmentalgraffiti.com/news-sharks-are-some-most-important-predators-our-panet (last
visited Jan. 25, 2012) (explaining how sharks, by preying on plankton feeders, ensure phyto-
plankton remains abundant, in turn affecting the world's oxygen supply).
20. WORLD BANK, THE SUNKEN BILLIONS: THE ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATION FOR FISHER-
IES REFORM 41 (2009), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTARD/Resources/
336681- 1224775570533/SunkenBillionsFinal.pdf.
21. Turnipseed et al., supra note 5, at 3.
22. The U.S. EEZ contains many different kinds of sharks; seventy-three species are
known to inhabit the Atlantic coastal waters alone. AMENDMENT 3, supra note 13, at 3-16. As
recently as 2006, a new species of shark was discovered off the coast of South Carolina, un-
derscoring the fact that we cannot even fully comprehend how much we stand to lose if
overfishing continues unchecked. New Shark Discovered in US Waters, BBC NEWS (June 10,
2006, 12:28 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/50655 I0.stm.
23. See Jacques A.A. Swart et al., Valuation of Nature in Conservation and Restoration,
9 RESTORATION ECOLOGY 230, 232 (2001).
24. Mandel, supra note 12, at 74.
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value of sharks could be a good reason for others to promote conservation. 25
The beauty of nature, including creatures such as sharks, is not easily quan-
tified, but for many people preserving such beauty is worth the conservation
effort.26
B. Shark Characteristics and Conservation Problems
The unique characteristics of sharks make them extremely vulnerable to
the most widespread problems in fisheries. Threats to sharks and other fish
worldwide include climate change-leading to ocean acidification and sea
level changes, invasive alien species, and ozone depletion.27 Although im-
pacting all fish generally, sharks are also particularly vulnerable to
overfishing and habitat destruction, 28 which has resulted in a sharp decline
in shark populations worldwide, many of which are not showing signs of
recovery.29 Sharks also have to deal with a unique problem: finning. Because
conservation law is aimed at preventing the sharp population declines that
ultimately lead to extinction, and fisheries law is aimed at sustainable use
rather than population destruction, it is useful to understand the underlying
causes of population decline in sharks.
1. Overfishing and Bycatch
Overfishing is a widespread problem in fisheries management; many
fish stocks are suffering from collapsing populations because of high fishing
pressure.30 Some sharks, such as porbeagle and spiny dogfish, are or have
been targeted stocks.3' Fish stocks that are not targeted, however, still suffer
from bycatch mortality. Bycatch occurs when vessels fishing for other fish
accidentally catch nontarget species, often leading to the death of the non-
25. Swart et al., supra note 23, at 232-33. Aesthetic values are partly economized when
people pay for viewing sharks, as in shark tourism or documentaries like Discovery Channel's
Shark Week.
26. See Mandel, supra note 12, at 74.
27. See Ashley L. Erickson, Out of Stock: Strengthening Fisheries Regulations to
Achieve a Healthier Ocean, 34 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 281, 285-86 (2008).
28. See, e.g., Dulvy et al., supra note 1, at 471-72 (identifying overfishing and finning
as the main threats).
29. Merry D. Camhi et al., Domestic and International Management for Pelagic Sharks,
in SHARKS OF THE OPEN OCEAN: BIOLOGY, FISHERIES AND CONSERVATION, supra note 2, at
418,419.
30. See CHARLES CLOVER, THE END OF THE LINE: How OVERFISHING IS CHANGING
THE WORLD AND WHAT WE EAT 3 (2006).
31. Sarah Fowler et al., Bundesamt fur Naturschutz [BfN] [Fed. Agency for Nature
Conservation] (Ger.), Trade in and Conservation of Two Shark Species, Porbeagle (Lamna
nasus) and Spiny Dogfish (Squalus acanthias) 12, 19, CITES CoP13 Inf. 16 (2004), available
at http://www.cites.org/eng/cop/l 3/inf/index.shtml (prepared for the Thirteenth Conference of
the Parties, Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flo-
ra, Bangkok, Thai., Oct. 2-14, 2004).
[Vol. 33:383
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target animal.32 Many oceanic shark species are bycatch in other fisheries,
such as tuna fisheries.
33
Generally, sharks have the same characteristics as other apex predators:
they produce few offspring and grow slowly.34 Their overall population
numbers, lifespan, and natural survival rate are also characteristics that con-
tribute to their unique vulnerability. Sharks' low fecundity means that they
are extremely vulnerable to overexploitation and, in fact, many populations
have seen rapid population declines because of unmanaged overfishing 5
The deeper causes of the overfishing problem are well known in general
fisheries management: overcapacity; subsidies; and illegal, unreported, and
unregulated (IUU) fishing.3 6 These problems are all related. Because fisher-
ies were highly profitable, more and bigger vessels started fishing, leading
to overcapacity as fishermen wanted to increase their individual shares.
37
Under political pressure, governments have provided subsidies to fishermen
to enable them to continue fishing.38 Without subsidies, fishing is very
unprofitable; it has been estimated that fishing efforts cost about one and
one-half times more than the catch is actually worth.39 Vessels that do not
receive enough legal opportunities can often continue to fish illegally. De-
spite the high cost of fishing, some of it-including shark fishing-can
remain profitable, especially when government subsidies end up in illegal
32. See, e.g., LEE A. KIMBALL, INTERNATIONAL OCEAN GOVERNANCE: USING INTER-
NATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATIONS TO MANAGE MARINE RESOURCES SUSTAINABLY 55
(2003) (noting that about one-third of global fish catch is bycatch). Bycatch also affects non-
fish animals such as turtles and seabirds. Id.
33. BARREIRA, supra note 6, at 5.
34. Id. at 4; see also Michael J. Barker & Vera Schluessel, Managing Global Shark
Fisheries: Suggestions for Prioritizing Management Strategies, 15 AQUATIC CONSERVATION:
MARINE & FRESHWATER ECOSYSTEMS 325, 326, 335-36 (2005) (noting that these traits are
common in "K-selected species" and comparing sharks to marine mammals).
35. See Elizabeth Griffin, Oceana Inc., Position Paper on Sea Turtle and Shark Bycatch
in Tuna RFMOs 2 (June 2010), available at http://www.tuna-org.org/Documents/Aus/ngo/
Oceana%2OViews%2OPaper-ENG.pdf (prepared for the Kobe II Bycatch Workshop, Brisbane,
Austl., June 23-24, 2010).
36. See Bertrand Le Gallic & Anthony Cox, An Economic Analysis of Illegal, Unreport-
ed and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing: Key Drivers and Possible Solutions, 30 MARINE POL'Y
689, 690 (2006) ("Overcapacity, ineffective management and subsidies are identified as three
of the major economic causes of IUU fishing."); see also Olav S. Stokke & Davor Vidas, Reg-
ulating Fishing or Combating IUU Operations?, in FISH PIRACY: COMBATING ILLEGAL,
UNREPORTED AND UNREGULATED FISHING 19, 31 (OECD ed., 2004).
37. This is a typical example of what economic theory calls the tragedy of the com-
mons, and fisheries management has unfortunately had little success in halting this
development. See Eric A. Bilsky, Conserving Marine Wildlife Through World Trade Law, 30
MICH. J. INT'L. L. 599, 609-10 (2009). The original author who coined the term "tragedy of
the commons" in the 1960s, Garrett Hardin, already predicted that open-access ocean fishing
would lead to extinction. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243,
1245 (1968).
38. Bilsky, supra note 37, at 618-19.
39. KIMBALL, supra note 32, at 54.
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fishermen's hands.40 In countries where enforcement is weak, IUU fishing is
easy, less costly, and more profitable.
41
Fish around the world suffer from overfishing because of weak en-
forcement and perverse incentives42 and sharks are no exception. However,
because of their unique characteristics, sharks are exceptionally vulnerable
and should be a priority when solving these larger fisheries problems.
43
2. Finning
Bycatch by itself does not have to be deadly; in fact, the survival rate
for many sharks is relatively high if they are released unharmed. 44 However,
fishermen who accidentally catch sharks often cut off the shark's fins and
discard the carcass, as fins have the highest economic value and take up
much less storage space. 45 Shark fins are popular in Asia, especially China,
46
as an ingredient in shark fin soup. As a result, the shark fin trade has become
a billion-dollar industry.
47
40. See Le Gallic & Cox, supra note 36, at 690-91.
41. See id.
42. See Bilsky, supra note 37, at 610.
43. See MERRY D. CAMHI ET AL., THE CONSERVATION STATUS OF PELAGIC SHARKS
AND RAYS: REPORT OF THE IUCN SHARK SPECIALIST GROUP PELAGIC SHARK RED LIST
WORKSHOP 38 (2009) ("Because fishing pressure on many already depleted shark species will
likely continue to grow, it is critical that conservation efforts are accelerated."). This Note is
too short to offer solutions to the world's fishery problems, and will focus instead on the more
immediate protection sharks need and how it can be achieved. In the long term, overcapacity
and IUU fishing need to be addressed if shark population recovery is to be sustainable. See id.
at 39. The international community is slowly working on addressing these issues; for instance,
the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has two voluntary plans of action to ad-
dress both problems. See FAO, INTERNATIONAL PLAN OF ACTION FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF
FISHING CAPACITY (1999); FAO, INTERNATIONAL PLAN OF ACTION TO PREVENT, DETER AND
ELIMINATE ILLEGAL, UNREPORTED AND UNREGULATED FISHING (2001) [hereinafter IPOA-
IUU], available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/y l224e/y 1224e00.htm.
44. See Fowler et al., supra note 31, at 26 (noting the spiny dogfish bycatch survival
rate can be good). Observer data from one fishery shows that the rate of sharks caught alive,
which can then presumably be released alive, can be over ninety percent for certain species.
MARY LACK & GLENN SANT, TRAFFIC, TRENDS IN GLOBAL SHARK CATCH AND RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN MANAGEMENT 18 (2009).
45. BARREIRA, supra note 6, at 5. Fins can sell for more than $700 per kilogram; a
basking shark fin can sell for up to $10,000. SONJA V. FORDHAM, SHARK ALLIANCE, SHARK
ALERT: REVEALING EUROPE'S IMPACT ON SHARK POPULATIONS 4 (2006). Even if the shark is
still alive when it is thrown back after the finning, it cannot survive without its fins, as it needs
to stay in motion to breathe. Jessica Spiegel, Even Jaws Deserves to Keep His Fins: Outlawing
Shark Finning Throughout Global Waters, 24 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 409, 410 (2001).
46. Scientists Trace Shark Fin Trade, NTDTV.coM (Dec. 2, 2009), http://english.ntdtv.
com/ntdtven/ns china/2009-12-02/716100898068.html.
47. Id.; see also Camhi et al., supra note 13, at 67 ("[I]ncreasing demand and prices




Because bycaught sharks are often finned, at least in waters where a
finning ban is not in place,48 the line between targeted fisheries and bycatch
is blurred. In some fisheries more sharks than the species ostensibly targeted
are caught. 9 The practice of finning accidentally caught sharks has been
particularly destructive and has received much attention in academic litera-
ture, in politics, and from environmental nongovernmental organizations
°.5
3. Habitat Destruction
Shark habitats, which include pupping and juvenile grounds, are easily
disturbed by the various types of fishing gear that many vessels use.5' Heavy
bottom trawls are particularly harmful: they are essentially large nets
dragged along the ocean floor that disturb everything in their paths, includ-
ing fragile ecosystems.52  Terrestrial development, including coastal
construction and tourism, also affects shark habitat.5 3 Such habitat destruc-
tion only exacerbates the pernicious effects of overfishing and is a separate
problem that needs addressing.
C. Current Domestic Policies
Several countries already have domestic shark conservation measures in
place, though not all of them are equally effective. The following brief, non-
exhaustive overview focuses on several domestic fishing initiatives. These
measures illustrate the breadth of approaches countries have taken in trying
to protect sharks-though it should not be forgotten that many countries still
lack any protective measures.54
1. The United States
The United States is a major shark-fishing nation, and its main use of
sharks is the consumption of mostly bycaught shark meat domestically.55
Though the U.S. commercial market for sharks is relatively small, it is still a
multimillion dollar industry that has seen a decline in recent years because
48. See infra Part I.C for a discussion on the U.S. shark finning ban.
49. Shark Bycatch, OCEANA, http://na.oceana.org/en/our-work/protect-marine-wildlife/
sharks/leam-act/shark-bycatch (last visited Oct. 27, 2011).
50. See, e.g., Spiegel, supra note 45, at 432-35; see also AMENDMENT 3, supra note 13,
at 3-8 to -12 (showing that several states have banned finning).
51. CAMHI ET AL., supra note 43, at 8.
52. Kunich, supra note 2, at 26. Bottom trawls are increasingly being banned because
of this impact. See MARINE CONSERVATION BIOLOGY INST., WHAT IS A BOTTOM TRAWL?
(2005), available at http://www.mcbi.org/what/what-pdfs/What_%20is_a_BottomTrawl.pdf.
53. Barker & Schluessel, supra note 34, at 336.
54. See, e.g., Camhi et al., supra note 29, at 421-22 (listing all the nations with shark
finning regulations, amounting to only twenty-one countries plus the European Union).
55. Cambi et al., supra note 13, at 177-78. There is some targeted shark fishing, but
most sharks in U.S. waters are caught as bycatch. Id. at 182.
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of overfishing.56 The recreational fishing industry is a multibillion dollar
industry, and many saltwater fishermen target sharks.57 Estimates used by
the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) show the recreational catch
to be in the hundreds of thousands of sharks, though most of them are
coastal sharks generally in less danger from international overfishing.58 The
United States therefore has an interest in preserving shark resources-both
coastal and migratory-to ensure continued economic return.
Sharks are a fisheries resource, and thus fall under the purview of the
Magnuson-Stevens Act, the main U.S. fisheries law.59 The federal govern-
ment has jurisdiction over highly migratory species in the Atlantic and may
devise fisheries management plans for those species.60 Since "oceanic
sharks" are considered highly migratory species, 61 the federal government
has devised shark management plans through the NMFS. 62 Management of
Pacific sharks has been left to the states acting within regional fisheries
councils. One example is the Pacific Fishery Management Council, which
manages many fish species in West Coast waters, including sharks.
63
56. AMENDMENT 3, supra note 13, at 3-80 to -84.
57. See id. at 3-57, 3-85 to -88.
58. Id. at 3-59. Recreational fishing represented almost thirty-six percent of small
coastal shark catches in 2008. Id. at 3-66.
59. Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-
1884 (2011). Section 1801(a)(l) makes clear that Congress considers all fish, both those off
the coast and highly migratory species, to be valuable resources. See id. § 1801(a)(l).
60. See id. §§ 1852(a)(3), 1854(g) (noting that the Secretary of Commerce shall manage
highly migratory Atlantic stocks).
61. Under § 1802(21), highly migratory stocks are defined to include oceanic sharks.
Id. § 1802(21). The term "oceanic sharks" often refers to only open ocean, or pelagic sharks.
See Camhi et al., supra note 29, at 418, 419. However, the federal Consolidated Atlantic High-
ly Migratory Species Fishery Management Plan (FMP) includes management of coastal
sharks as well. AMENDMENT 3, supra note 13, at v; see also id. at D-40 (discussing whether
smooth dogfish are "oceanic shark[sI").
62. The latest revision of the federal FMP was promulgated in March 2010. See
AMENDMENT 3, supra note 13, at 1-1.
63. The Pacific Fishery Management Council manages sharks in a specific Highly Mi-
gratory Species FMP. See PAC. FISHERY MGMT. COUNCIL, FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR
U.S. WEST COAST FISHERIES FOR HIGHLY MIGRATORY SPECIES: As AMENDED BY AMENDMENT
1, at 27-30 (2007) [hereinafter PACIFIC FMP], available at http://www.pcouncil.org/wp-
content/uploads/HMSFMP Aug09.pdf.
Western Pacific shark fisheries (around Hawaii, Guam, and American Samoa) are man-
aged in a Pelagic FMP, most recently amended in March 2009. See W. PAC. REG'L FISHERY
MGMT. COUNCIL, AMENDMENT 18 TO THE FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR PELAGIC FISH-
ERIES OF THE WESTERN PACIFIC REGION 4-10 (2009), available at http://www.wpcouncil.
org/pelagic/Documents/FMP/Amd%2018.pdf.
Northern Pacific sharks are principally managed as bycatch under the Groundfish FMPs,
although this may change in the near future. See N. PAC. FISHERY MGMT. COUNCIL, DRAFT
ACTION PLAN TO REVISE MANAGEMENT OF SHARKS AND SCULPINS IN THE GROUNDFISH





All of the relevant plans contain various shark conservation measures.
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Although they are not perfect (for example, the final measures in the most
recent federal plan are much weaker than the originally proposed
measures), 65 these plans do show that the United States takes shark
management seriously. At the end of 2010, Congress showed that shark con-
servation is still on the agenda when it passed a bill to close a loophole that
existed in the law banning shark finning.66 Individual states also have a vari-
ety of shark protection laws in place, mainly applicable to coastal shark
fisheries within state waters.
67
2. The European Union
The E.U. member states' combined fishing fleets have a significant im-
pact on Atlantic fish stocks. 68 In fact, because European vessels operate
everywhere, "the EU is possibly the world's largest shark fishing entity."
69
All fisheries, including sharks, fall under the Common Fisheries Policy
64. See, e.g., AMENDMENT 3, supra note 13, at v (establishing a quota for several Atlan-
tic sharks); PACIFIC FMP, supra note 63, at 97-98 (describing measures aimed at protecting
essential fish habitat, including shark habitat).
65. As with many regulations, the agencies responsible receive many comments from
organizations that believe the rules should be stricter or less strict. See, e.g., AMENDMENT 3,
supra note 13, at D-20. The federal FMP became notably less strict between the proposed and
final measures, not implementing some proposed stricter quotas and gear restrictions. Id. at v.
66. The original shark finning ban was contained in the Shark Finning Prohibition Act,
Pub. L. No. 106-557, sec. 3, § 307(1), 114 Stat. 2772, 2772 (2000) (amending the Magnuson-
Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1857(1)(P)
(2000)). The new bill amended this section at the end of 2010. Shark Conservation Act of
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-348, sec. 103(a), § 307(l), 124 Stat. 3668, 3670 (2010) (amending the
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act) (codified at 16 U.S.C.
§ 1857(1)(P) (2011)).
67. See AMENDMENT 3, supra note 13, at 3-8 to -12 (listing various state measures).
One of the most recent measures is the State of Washington's banning of the shark fin trade.
Emily Fisher, Victory for Sharks in Washington State, OCEANA (May 13, 2011), http://na.
oceana.org/en/blog/201 1/05/victory-for-sharks-in-washington-state?utm-source=
facebook&utmmedium=social&utm-campaign=sharks. California's legislature also passed a
ban prohibiting the possession or sale of shark fins, making it the largest economy in the world
to fully ban finning. Bettina Wassener, Shark-Fin Vote Adds Pressure on Hong Kong,
N.Y. TIMES GREEN BLOG (Sept. 12, 2011, 12:48 PM), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/
2011/09/12/shark-fin-vote-adds-to-pressure-on-hong-kong/. With the bill now signed into law,
most of the Pacific states and Guam have finning bans in place. California: Governor Signs
Ban on Shark Fins, N.Y. TiMEs, Oct. 8, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/l0/08/us/
califomia-govemor-signs-ban-on-shark-fins.html.
68. See Commission Green Paper on Reform of the Common Fisheries Policy, at 5-6,
COM (2009) 163 final (Apr. 22, 2009) [hereinafter Commission Green Paper] (showing that
the impact of decades of overfishing in Europe has been huge, and that many fish stocks in
European waters are overfished).
69. Commission Public Consultation on the Amendment of Council Regulation (EC)
1185/2003 on the Removal of Fins of Sharks on Board Vessels, at 5 (Nov. 19, 2010) [hereinaf-
ter Commission Public Consultation], available at http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/partners/
consultations/sharkfinningban/consultation documenten.pdf.
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(CFP).7° Under the CFP, the European Council sets catch limits, commonly
known as total allowable catches (TACs), for all regulated species.7 In more
recent years, shark fishing has been increasingly restricted, and fishing for
some shark species is banned entirely.72 These developments have been part-
ly driven by the work of the RFMOs of which the European Union is a
member.73
Although the CFP has improved over the years, historically the CFP has
not been well regarded by environmentalists or academics.74 The main prob-
lem with the policy lies in its political infrastructure. Many European
countries have large fleets, and all want to have a large share in the fisheries
resources.75 Because catch limits are set through political negotiations dom-
inated by short-term interests, this has led to overfishing.7 6 Sharks in
European waters have also suffered both as targeted species and as by-
catch.77 As a result of continuing criticism and declining fish stocks, the
European Union has started a reform process that resulted in a flurry of
documents and debate in 2011.78
The European Union's reputation has not fared much better in the spe-
cific field of shark conservation. One observer concluded only a few years
ago, in somewhat of an understatement, that "the [European Community]
has not developed a strong policy for the conservation and management of
70. Council Regulation 2371/2002, art. 1, 2002 O.J. (L 358) 59, 61 (EC).
71. Id. art. 20.
72. Council Regulation 57/2011, pmbl. (8), art. 19, 2011 O.J. (L 24) 1, 1 (EU). Annex
I sets out the TACs for 2011.
73. Id. pmbl. (18)-(19).
74. See, e.g., Tim Daw & Tim Gray, Fisheries Science and Sustainability in Interna-
tional Policy: A Study of Failure in the European Union's Common Fisheries Policy, 29
MARINE POL'Y 189, 196 (2005) (noting that "the [Common Fisheries] [P]olicy is widely rec-
ognised as a failure").




77. For instance, until the end of the 2009 fishing season, the European Union allowed
fishing for porbeagle (Lamna nasus) and spiny dogfish (Squalus acanthias). Council Regula-
tion 43/2009, Annex IA, 2009 O.J. (L 22) 1, 49, 92 (EC). However, both have been listed as
critically endangered in the northeast Atlantic since 2006. See IUCN, Lamna nasus (Northeast
Atlantic Subpopulation), http://www.iucnredlist.org/apps/redlist/details/39343/0 (last visited
Jan. 25, 2012); IUCN, Squalus acanthias (Northeast Atlantic Subpopulation),
http://www.iucnredlist.org/apps/redlist/details/44168/0 (last visited Jan 25, 2012). Despite this
knowledge and a push ironically led by the European Union in 2007 to put porbeagle on a list
of international trade-restricted species, see infra note 120, it was not until 2010 that fishing
for these species was prohibited. Council Regulation 23/2010, art. 6, Annex IA, 2010 0.1. (L
21) 1, 7, 29, 59 (EC).
78. An overview of the reform process and links to all the relevant documents can be
found in Reform of the Common Fisheries Policy, EUR. COMM'N FISHERIES, http://ec.europa.
eu/fisheries/reform/index en.htm (last updated Oct. 6, 2011).
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sharks."79 The European Union does have a shark finning regulation in place
as part of the CFP.80 However, it is considered critically flawed because it
uses a fin-to-carcass ratio instead of a categorical ban on finning, and for
that reason it has been heavily criticized.81 After criticism within RFMOs,
and NGO pressure leading up to a European Parliament resolution, 82 the
European Commission has started reviewing the finning measure.
83
3. Palau's Shark Sanctuary
While it is impossible to discuss all domestic measures in this Note, one
deserves a special mention: Palau's Shark Sanctuary. The small island na-
tion of Palau created a sanctuary in 2009 to prevent foreign vessels from
fishing for or finning sharks within its EEZ.84 Commercial shark fishing and
finning are now prohibited in Palau's waters, although enforcement by Palau
itself is difficult given that Palau has only one patrol boat.85 Nevertheless,
the sanctuary has been a boon for Palau's economy, has been commended
by researchers and environmentalists, and has served as model for other na-
tions' own conservation efforts.86
II. WHY INTERNATIONAL LAW Is NEEDED
TO IMPROVE CONSERVATION
Because sharks tend to move between EEZs, and between EEZs and the
high seas, unilateral management can only do so much.87 International law
79. BARREIRA, supra note 6, at 30.
80. Council Regulation 1185/2003, pmbl. (1), (6), 2003 O.J. (L 167) 1, 1 (EC).
81. See, e.g., FORDHAM, supra note 45, at 14 (noting that "loopholes are rendering this
critical regulation all but meaningless"). For an explanation and criticism of the fin-to-carcass
ratio method, see infra notes 235-239 and accompanying text.
82. European Parliament Supports Strengthening Shark Finning Ban, WORLD FISHING
& AQUACULTURE (Dec. 16, 2010), http://www.worldfishing.netlnewslOlleuropean-pariarnent-
supports-strengthening-shark-finning-ban.
83. See Commission Public Consultation, supra note 69, at 1. The Commission has
invited all "interested parties" to submit their views on the measure. Id. at 10.
84. Richard Black, Palau Pioneers 'Shark Sanctuary,' BBC NEWS (Sep. 25, 2009 01:03
AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8272508.stm. This move was inspired by an NGO that has
pushed for the measure since 2001. See Welcome to Palau Shark Sanctuary, PALAU SHARK
SANCTUARY, http://www.sharksanctuary.coml (last visited Jan. 25, 2012).
85. Black, supra note 84. However, port states all over the world may take measures to
prevent or punish landing of illegally caught Palau sharks. Other management and enforce-
ment options in cooperation with Palau and the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries
Commission, such as certifying all Palau catch or creating and sharing lists of vessels that are
known to fish illegally in the area, may be available. See infra Parts Ill.B.3 and HI.C.1-2.
86. See Jolly, supra note 17 (noting that the Maldives have declared a similar shark
sanctuary, and that other popular diving destinations are considering shark protections as
well).
87. This does not mean that domestic measures are irrelevant-they are, in fact, incred-
ibly important both as a way of implementing international agreements and by providing
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has tried to fill the gaps in domestic management measures for such highly
migratory stocks, and as part of its gap-filling efforts has encouraged coop-
eration to conserve migratory animals.
A. Nature of Conservation Problems
Because of the mobile nature of sharks and other highly migratory spe-
cies, international law is an important tool for coordinating management
measures across states in which these fish stocks are found. For instance, the
United States explicitly recognizes this in the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery
Conservation and Management Act, which makes various references to in-
ternational cooperation and RFMOs.88 The management plans created
pursuant to the Magnuson-Stevens Act also refer to international organiza-
tions and international measures in addition to domestic measures,
especially where sharks are involved.8 9 The NMFS, in the recent Amend-
ment 3 to the Atlantic Fisheries Management Plan for Highly Migratory
Species, even specifically refused to implement domestic measures for
shortfin mako, stating that the United States had only a small impact on
shortfin mako mortality; instead, it focused on international efforts to im-
prove shortfin mako management. 90 Other states have recognized the need
for cooperation as well. The European Union, in its European Plan of Action
for Sharks, noted that international cooperation within RFMOs is a key
component of shark protection.9' As a result, international law on fisheries
and marine wildlife has developed cooperative mechanisms over the past
decades in an attempt to solve the problems plaguing sharks.
Some commentators heavily criticize international law, including envi-
ronmental law, for being ineffective at solving problems such as shark
impetus for improving international management. See Camhi et al., supra note 29, at 433. For
the United States in particular, considering the sheer size of its EEZ, any domestic shark man-
agement measures will likely also have a relatively significant international impact simply by
being in place. Cf 16 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(4) (2011) (noting that "international fishery agree-
ments have not been effective" and considering unilateral action necessary); id. § 1801(a)(6).
88. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1812(a)-(c) (noting that "[t]he United States shall cooperate
directly or through appropriate international organizations" to ensure Highly Migratory Spe-
cies (HMS) conservation); id. § 1822(e) (international fishery agreements for HMS); id.
§ 1854(g)(1)(F) (mandating the Secretary of Commerce to pursue "international fishery man-
agement measures" through international entities).
89. See, e.g., PACIFIc FMP, supra note 63, at 21; id. at 23 ("For most management unit
species in this FMP [including sharks], U.S. harvest by West Coast-based vessels represents
only a fraction of total fishing mortality ... and any unilateral action ... would not likely have
a significant biological effect on the stock."); see also id. at 4 ("Conservation of HMS is con-
tingent on effective international management institutions and measures.").
90. AMENDMENT 3, supra note 13, at 4-34 to -35.
91. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and Council on a
European Community Action Plan for the Conservation and Management of Sharks, at 7-8,
COM (2009) 40 final (Feb. 5, 2009) [hereinafter EPOA-Sharks].
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overfishing.9 2 The main critiques are that international law's implementation
is marred by state self-interest, and that there is no international enforce-
ment mechanism that can get states to comply. 93 These are criticisms heard
often in the field of international law generally, but they are based on a view
of law as force.94 International law and institutions operate on other levels
beyond enforcement (the use of force to obtain compliance). Compliance
(the following of international norms) is of course necessary to effectively
implement measures, but compliance can take place through objective in-
formation gathering, general assistance to nations, and norm setting and
norm reinforcing. 95 The process of international norms development was
famously theorized by Finnemore and Sikkink, who "argue that norms
evolve in a patterned 'life cycle.' "96 A norm emerges because norm entre-
preneurs convince states to embrace a new norm, which then may "cascade"
through the rest of the international community and ultimately be internal-
ized and adhered to without much debate. 97
Once a norm emerges in international wildlife law, as set by interna-
tional institutions, it can start "permeating national policy discourse, legal
instruments and (slowly) judicial decision-making." 98 This process does not
necessarily involve force-based compliance, but rather shows that the inter-
national norm can spread through domestic means. Conversely, national
policy may influence and reinforce international norm setting, causing the
norm to cascade. As a case in point, shark conservation has become a more
prominent part of discussions at the RFMO level as more and more coun-
tries protect sharks domestically.99 While it is hard to assess the
effectiveness of international wildlife law generally,100 even in the narrow
field of shark conservation some other norm setting and reinforcement can
92. See Kunich, supra note 2, at 102-04 ("[I]ntemational law has not and cannot pro-
vide the resolution to the mass extinction crisis in the world's oceans.").
93. id.
94. Id. at 104 ("The truth is that within any sovereign nation, the rule of law is but-
tressed by the use of force."); see also Mark Toufayan, Identity, Effectiveness, and Newness in
Transjudicialism's Coming of Age, 31 MICH. J. INT'L L. 307, 311-12 (2010) ("[M]any inter-
national lawyers still look to enforcement as the answer to perennial debates on the perceived
'ineffectiveness' of international law .... ").
95. Lee A. Kimball, Whither International Institutional Arrangements to Support
Ocean Law?, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 307, 317-18 (1997). See also infra note 247 and
accompanying text. This model of ensuring compliance, which relies less on coercion and
force and more on management and cooperation, has been called the "managerial model."
DANIEL BODANSKY, THE ART AND CRAFT OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 236-37
(2010).
96. Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political
Change, 52 INT'L ORG. 887, 888 (1998).
97. Id. at 895.
98. MICHAEL BOWMAN ET AL., LYSTER'S INTERNATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 116-17 (2d
ed. 2010).
99. See infra Part HI.C.
100. BOWMAN ET AL., supra note 98, at 117.
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be found. In the European CFP, express reference is now made to shark pro-
tection and the measures RFMOs have taken. 01 This indicates that the
European Union is increasingly complying with an emerging international
norm of shark conservation, despite not being in any way "forced" to do so.
The international institutional framework for wildlife and fisheries is
generally accepted, and the major fishing nations operate within it. Instead
of delegitimizing this framework by decrying it as ineffective, it would be
much more constructive to improve it and ensure that emerging norms like
shark conservation are supported and implemented domestically. The fol-
lowing Sections, while mindful of the limitations and shortcomings of
international law, explain how the fisheries framework operates and could be
improved.
B. Relevant Frameworks of International Law-
Nonfisheries Agreements
Shark issues span multiple subareas of international environmental law.
The international fisheries regime is the most important area, and it will be
surveyed in greater depth in Part III below. However, fisheries treaties form
only one part, albeit a crucial part, of a slowly emerging international shark
management regime that spans multiple, traditionally separate areas.'0 2
Thus, it is useful to highlight other regimes within the framework of interna-
tional environmental law that have complemented international fisheries law
in addressing shark conservation issues."0 3 The Convention on Biological
Diversity (CBD), 1°4 wildlife conservation treaties, and trade treaties com-
plement the international fisheries regime in achieving the goals of shark
management.10
101. See Council Regulation 57/2011, supra note 72, pmbl. In (18)-(19).
102. See BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 8, at 84-85. Shark issues continuously come up un-
der various treaties, increasingly as separate topics of discussion, so there is a need for more
coordination. Since early 2010, under the auspices of the CMS, a memorandum to address
migratory shark issues has been created that provides for regular meetings to discuss crosscut-
ting shark issues. See Memorandum of Understanding on the Conservation of Migratory
Sharks, Feb. 12, 2010 (entered into force Mar. 1, 2010) [hereinafter Sharks MoU], available at
http://www.ecolex.org/server2.php/libcat/docs/TRE/Multilateral/En/TRE1 54630.pdf. Expert
bodies are now increasingly supplying information on sharks, such as the International Com-
mission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna [ICCAT] Sharks Rapporteur. See Standing
Committee on Research and Statistics (SCRS), ICCAT, http://www.iccat.int/en/SCRS.htm (last
updated July 19, 2011). This information may be shared across organizations in different sub-
ject-matter areas to achieve a more holistic approach to shark problems.
103. See Camhi et al., supra note 29, at 430-31 (noting that wildlife conservation treaties
have been used to address perceived gaps in the fisheries regime and that these provide a
"complementary route" to shark conservation).
104. Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature June 5, 1992, 1760
U.N.T.S. 79 [hereinafter CBD].
105. See Barker & Schluessel, supra note 34, at 330.
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1. The Convention on Biological Diversity
The CBD is a framework treaty containing broad conservation princi-
ples. Although the United States is not a party to the CBD, other major
fishing nations and the European Union are. 106 The CBD obliges a member
state to protect biological diversity and resources, including sharks, within
its national jurisdiction and when subjected to activities under its national
control. 10 7 Activities under national control include all fishing carried out by
ships flying the member state's flag.'08 The treaty's principle of sustainable
use resonates in other environmental conventions, such as the U.N. Fish
Stocks Agreement (UNFSA). 1"9 Since many marine species are not confined
to national boundaries, the broad application of the CBD is especially rele-
vant in the marine context. 0 Thus, CBD member states should ensure that
sharks are sustainably used and protected on the national level.
The CBD has had norm-setting influence beyond imposing somewhat
amorphous obligations to preserve biological diversity. Key principles from
the treaty-such as sustainable use-have influenced fisheries law, at least
by being inserted into the vocabulary of fisheries law."1 ' The CBD has
achieved this by explicitly connecting the U.N. Law of the Sea Convention
(UNCLOS) I 2 to its own provisions." 3 UNCLOS by itself did call for
106. 3 MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ch.
XXVII, no. 8, http://treaties.un.org/pagesNiewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsgno=
XXVII-8&chapter=27&lang=en (last updated Feb. 11, 2012). The United States is a signatory
to the CBD, however, and so under customary treaty law should not act so as to defeat its
purpose. Id.; see Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 18, opened for signature May
23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
107. The general obligations on member states are laid down in Article 8 of the CBD and
include ensuring regulation of biological resources to ensure conservation and sustainable use,
protection of habitat, and rehabilitating degraded species. See CBD, supra note 104, art. 8(c)-
(d), (f).
108. Id. art. 4.
109. U.N. Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, Aug. 4, 1995, 2167
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 11, 2001) [hereinafter UNFSA]. See also infra note 162
and accompanying text.
110. See A. CHARLOTTE DE FONTAUBERT ET AL., BIODIVERSITY IN THE SEAS: IMPLE-
MENTING THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY IN MARINE AND COASTAL HABITATS
2-4 (1996).
111. See infra notes 160, 167 and accompanying text (explaining the interaction between
the CBD and UNCLOS, and noting that the UNFSA contains a sustainable use obligation);
LEE A. KIMBALL, CBD TECHNICAL SER. No. 19, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME OF THE
HIGH SEAS AND THE SEABED BEYOND THE LIMITS OF NATIONAL JURISDICTION AND OPTIONS
FOR COOPERATION FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MARINE PROTECTED AREAS (MPAs) IN MA-
RINE AREAS BEYOND NATIONAL JURISDICTION 10 (2005), available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/
publications/cbd-ts- 1 9.pdf.
112. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994) [hereinafter UNCLOS].
113. CBD, supra note 104, art. 22(2). See infra note 160 and accompanying text.
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cooperation in fisheries management, but did not set any background princi-
ples to mitigate overfishing problems." 4 Now, CBD's principles guide the
amorphous cooperation mandate towards the goal of sustainable use.
2. Wildlife Conservation Treaties
Wildlife conservation treaties include several regional regimes 5 and
two global ones-the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species (CITES)'" 6 and the Convention on Migratory Species (CMS)."1
7
Both global treaties have been active in shark conservation.
Both CMS and CITES operate by listing species on appended lists. De-
pending on the list the species is on, member states incur particular
international obligations. For instance, they may be required to prohibit kill-
ing of a listed species under CMS, or to prohibit or monitor trade in the
species under CITES." 8 Several shark species are included in these appen-
dices, though only the more well-known, iconic shark species have received
strong protection under these agreements." 9 Some countries have proposed
listing species such as the porbeagle shark, which is commercially valuable
and highly overfished, on a CITES appendix. However, these proposals have
been defeated in two successive Conferences of the Parties,' indicating that
114. See infra notes 156-161 and accompanying text.
115. For instance, the Bern Convention, which is similar to the CMS, applies only within
Europe. Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats, opened
for signature Sep. 19, 1979, E.T.S. No.104 (entered into force June 1, 1982); BOWMAN ET AL.,
supra note 98, at xvii-xxvi, 13-23.
116. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
arts. III-IV, opened for signature Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter
CITES].
117. CMS, supra note 7.
118. CMS has two appendices: for species listed on Appendix I, the convention imposes
strict obligations on states to prohibit taking (which includes killing) of species; for species
listed on Appendix I, the convention only encourages cooperation to improve conservation.
See CMS, supra note 7, arts. III, IV. CITES has three appendices, each imposing a decreasing
degree of trade restrictions, from very strict limitations on the trade in species listed on Ap-
pendix I to hardly any restrictions on the trade in species listed on Appendix III. See CITES,
supra note 116, arts. III-V.
119. The only two listed on both Appendix I of CMS and Appendix II of CITES, and
thus receiving strong protection, are the great white and the basking sharks. The whale shark,
the largest fish in the world, is listed on Appendix II of CITES and Appendix II of CMS. The
shortfin and longfin mako sharks are also on Appendix II of CMS. See List of Common
Names, CMS Appendices I and II, CMS.INT, http://www.cms.int/pdf/en/CMS-Species-
61ng.pdf (last updated Apr. 2011); Appendices 1, H and III, CITES.oRG, http://www.cites.org/
eng/app/appendices.php (last updated Apr. 27, 2011).
120. The original porbeagle proposal was put forward by Germany on behalf of the Eu-
ropean Union in 2007. Fourteenth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties, The Hague,
Neth., June 3-15, 2007, Consideration of Proposals for Amendment of Appendices I and II:
Inclusion of Lamna nasus, at 1, CoP 14 Prop. 15 (Apr. 18, 2007), available at http://www.
cites.org/eng/cop/14/prop/E14-P15.pdf; see also Fowler et al., supra note 31, at 6 (noting that
originally, the German proposal was not even accepted within the European Union). That
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securing shark conservation through an appendix listing is perhaps not the
most effective way forward.
A more positive development happened in 2010 under the auspices of
the CMS. A memorandum of understanding was signed in February of that
year, aimed at improving conservation of several pelagic sharks. 12' The
memorandum explicitly calls for increased cooperation between all relevant
international organizations and other stakeholders. These organizations
include the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)-which has a
voluntary International Plan of Action for Sharks (IPOA-Sharks)112-and
the several RFMOs. 123 The United States is one of the initial signatories to
the memorandum,124 despite not being a party to the CMS itself. 25 In No-
vember 2011, the memorandum received a major boost when the European
Union and several of its member states signed it. The total number of parties
as of November 2011 stands at twenty-four. 26 Hopefully their participation
will greatly boost the effectiveness of the memorandum.
While there are some problems with the implementation of the treaties
themselves, 2 7 a more fundamental problem is that they are not focused on
the use of species but on their preservation. They are invoked only when a
species is close to extinction, and they are not well designed to address the
proactive, holistic management needs of a fisheries resource. 28 Since the
proposal was rejected; it was reintroduced at the next Conference of the Parties in 2010, this
time by Sweden and Palau. Fifteenth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties, Doha, Qatar,
Mar. 13-25, 2010, Consideration of Proposals for Amendment of Appendices I and II: Inclu-
sion of Lamna nasus, at 2, CoP15 Prop. 17 (Dec. 1, 2009), available at http://www.cites.org/
eng/cop/15/prop/E-15-Prop-17.pdf. That proposal initially passed but, to the dismay of many
environmental NGOs, was later defeated again, together with seven other shark proposals,
when the debate was reopened under pressure of Asian countries. See Will Ramos, Porbeagle
Shark Dealt Setback at UN Meeting, CONSORTIUM FOR OCEAN LEADERSHIP (Mar. 26, 2010,
7:02 AM), http://www.oceanleadership.org/2010/porbeagle-shark-dealt-setback-at-un-
meeting/.
121. Sharks MoU, supra note 102, annex 1 (listing the seven shark species of concern).
122. FAO, INTERNATIONAL PLAN OF ACTION FOR THE CONSERVATION AND MANAGE-
MENT OF SHARKS 10 (1999) [hereinafter IPOA-Sharks], available at http://www.fao.org/
docrep/006/x3170e/x3170e03.htm.
123. Sharks MoU, supra note 102, 1 6.
124. Summary Sheet of the Memorandum of Understanding on the Conservation of Mi-
gratory Sharks, CMS.INT, http://www.cms.int/pdf/en/summary-sheets/sharks.pdf (last
updated Nov. 25, 2011) [hereinafter Summary Sheet].
125. This is allowed under Article V(2) of the CMS. See CMS, supra note 7.
126. See Summary Sheet, supra note 124.
127. For an overview of how these treaties and the IPOA-Sharks operate to protect
sharks and how they could be improved, see Holly Edwards, When Predators Become Prey:
The Need for International Shark Conservation, 12 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 305, 340 (2007).
Edwards notes several shortcomings, including the lack of an implementing agreement under
the CMS, which at least has since been resolved.
128. See CITES, supra note 116, art. II. Appendix I is reserved for species threatened
with extinction, and Appendix II for species that are close to being threatened. See also John
C. Kunich, Fiddling Around While the Hotspots Burn Out, 14 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 179,
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iconic larger sharks are rare and not often commercially targeted except for
finning or recreation, it was much easier to agree that they cannot be taken
at all. 29 While the CMS Memorandum of Understanding is a great step to-
wards improving interaction between the different treaties and their
purposes, the principal use of wildlife conservation treaties for shark con-
servation is perhaps best characterized as a "stop-gap measure" when
fisheries regimes "have failed to ensure the sustainable use of shark species
in trade."' 30
3. International Trade Law
The international trade regime, primarily the World Trade Organization
(WTO), has also been put forward as a way to improve fisheries
management more generally.13' Since fish, including sharks, are increasingly
a traded food commodity, 132 subsidies that aid fisheries could fall under the
WTO Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement as they do for
farm products. 133 Alternatively, pressure on foreign countries to use more
sustainable fishing methods through unilateral trade measures, such as those
allowed in the U.S.-Shrimp case, 134 has been suggested as a way to
improve fisheries.' For instance, major fish importers such as the United
States or European Union 136 could refuse to import fish that has been caught
197-98 (2001) ("CITES operates one species at a time, and cannot help until a species ap-
proaches its deathbed-a decidedly ineffective approach even to aiding individual species, let
alone entire ecosystems or hotspots.").
129. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. See also Camhi et al., supra note 29, at
423 ("Too often, such action is reserved for the most charismatic or targetable species ... .
130. Camhi et al., supra note 29, at 431.
131. See, e.g., Bilsky, supra note 37, at 621. CITES is also a trade agreement, but is
usually classified with wildlife conservation agreements as its aim is not so much facilitating
trade as it is curbing trade in protected species. See Camhi et al., supra note 29, at 43 1.
132. Trade in oceanic species has risen from less than a million metric tons in 1980 to
almost 2.5 million metric tons in 2000. SIMON UPTON & VANGELIS VITALIS, ORG. FOR ECON.
Co-op. & DEV. [OECD], STOPPING THE HIGH SEAS ROBBERS: COMING TO GRIPS WITH ILLE-
GAL, UNREPORTED AND UNREGULATED FISHERIES ON THE HIGH SEAS 4 (2003), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/5/42/39360798.pdf.
133. Bilsky, supra note 37, at 632 ("Since all Article 3 subsidies are deemed to be specif-
ic, amending Article 3 to prohibit subsidies to fishing enterprises would be an effective
solution to the problem.").
134. Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, 3, 152, WT/DS58AB/RW, (Oct. 22, 2001). This case is also known
commonly as the Shrimp-Turtle case.
135. Bilsky, supra note 37, at 639.
136. A Green Paper by the European Commission in 2009 noted that "more than half of
the fish consumed on the European market is now imported." Commission Green Paper, supra
note 68, at 5.
[Vol. 33:383
Save Our Sharks
by vessels from countries without a proper shark bycatch reduction
program.'37
However, reaching agreements during current WTO negotiations has
been challenging, and not only in the area of subsidies. 3 ' Despite recently
renewed calls by other organizations to comprehensively address fisheries
subsidies, 13 9 this is an issue on which "negotiations have lagged."'4 ° Consid-
ering that most seafood in major Western nations like the United States is
imported,' 4' unilateral measures could be effective but problematic under
WTO rules.'4 As such, it is doubtful that the WTO could effectively protect
137. For example, the U.S. government could find Congressional authorization for this in
16 U.S.C. § 1826k. The statute allows the Secretary of Commerce to identify nations that have
fishing practices that result in bycatch of "a protected living marine resource," which includes
nontarget fish such as sharks, and engage in intensive negotiations to ensure other nations
adopt good fishing practices. Id. § 1826k(a)(1)(A)(i). If both international and bilateral negoti-
ations fail, the government could classify fishing by such nations as IUU fishing under
§ 1826j(e)(3) and impose (unilateral) sanctions. Id. § 1826j(e)(3). The new Shark Conserva-
tion Act in fact explicitly allows such classification at least under some circumstances, as it
adds fishing in violation of "shark conservation requirements" imposed by international organ-
izations to the list of fishing that may be classified as IUU fishing under that section. Shark
Conservation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-348, sec. 102(b)(1), § 609(e)(3)(A), 124 Stat.
3668, 3669 (2010) (amending the High Seas Driftnet Fishing Moratorium Protection Act)
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1826j(e)(3) (2011)). Spurred by CITES, the UNFSA, and RFMOs, the
European Union is currently in the early stages of considering the use of trade restrictions to
promote fisheries conservation under its exclusive fisheries and trade competences. Commis-
sion Roadmap on EU Trade-Related Measures for the Conservation of Fish Resources, at 2
(Apr. 2011), available at http://ec.europa.eu/govemance/impact/plannedia/docs/201 1_mare_
042_traderelatedmeasuresen.pdf. See infra Part III.C.2 for a discussion of unilateral
measures countries generally can take to improve shark conservation.
138. Because a consensus on various topics cannot be reached, negotiations have now
broken up along three tracks, with the most contentious issues, including subsidies, being put
on the "slow" track. Members Support Lamy's Proposed Three-Speed Search for Doha Out-
come in December, WORLD TRADE ORG. [WTO (May 31, 2011), http://www.wto.org/englishl
newse/newsl Ie/tncinfstat_31 mayl le.htm.
139. For example, the U.N. Environment Programme published a report in December
2010 on the need for the WTO to address fisheries subsidies. UNEP Report Highlights Role
of Fisheries Subsidies Reform in Ocean Sustainability, U.N. ENV'T PROGRAMME (Dec. 22,
2010), http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.aspDocumentlD=653&
ArticlelD=6875.
140. Jonathan Lynn, WTO's Lamy Says Final Doha Countdown Has Begun, REUTERS,
Nov. 30, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.comlarticle/2010/l 1/30/us-trade-doha-
idUSTRE6AT3OT20101130.
141. See, e.g., FishWatch-U.S. Seafood Facts, NMFS, http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/
fishwatch/tradeandaquaculture.htm (last updated Sep. 13, 2011). The United States alone
imports over a billion dollars worth of tuna annually. See id.
142. Unilateral trade measures to protect natural resources are generally only allowed
when bi- and multilateral negotiations to address the problem have been exhausted, especially
when the problem is transboundary in nature. Appellate Body Report, United States-Import
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 166-68, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12,
1998). Since the dialogue on sharks is ongoing in several international fora, it might be that
the exhaustion requirement is not met. On the other hand, the WTO panel did not require full
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sharks in the short term, although it is undoubtedly an important forum in
which to address the problem of fisheries subsidies.
143
III. INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES LAW:
MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES
A decade ago, conservationists and governments turned away from in-
ternational fisheries law as a way to conserve sharks, instead favoring
wildlife treaties. 144 However, the wildlife conservation treaties' performance
in conserving sharks has been disappointing, as illustrated by the most re-
cent CITES Conference of the Parties, 145 and WTO negotiations on fisheries
subsidies continue to move at a glacial pace. Since other regimes are cur-
rently failing to protect sharks, fisheries organizations remain the most
suitable venue to ensure shark conservation more immediately. They are
uniquely well situated to address the problems that cause the depletion of
shark populations. Fisheries management organizations can impose fishing
restrictions to combat shark overfishing and bycatch, and they can set up
programs to accumulate much-needed shark fisheries data. 146 Unfortunately,
most RFMOs have been extremely slow in adopting shark-related
measures.'47 Reviewing the fisheries regime's past efforts to protect sharks
and analyzing the potential for its improvement are both essential in finding
solutions to the problems that face sharks.
A. The International Fisheries Regime
International fisheries law is a highly regionalized body of law.148 There
are two important framework conventions that guide most of the interstate
cooperation that occurs in RFMOs: The U.N. Convention on the Law of the
Sea and the U.N. Fish Stocks Agreement.
conclusion of the negotiations. Id. 123, 133. So, whether trade restrictions would stand is
an open question. See also infra Part III.C.2.
143. See Bilsky, supra note 37, at 640-41.
144. Camhi et al., supra note 29, at 430.
145. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
146. See Edwards, supra note 127, at 341; see also Camhi et al., supra note 29, at 428-30.
147. Camhi et al., supra note 29, at 428.
148. For a graphical overview of the many RFMOs and other regional seas conventions
in existence in 2001, see FAO, Ecosystem-Based Management of Fisheries: Opportunities and
Challenges for Coordination Between Marine Regional Fishery Bodies and Regional Seas
Conventions, Annex 2, Doc. No. RFB/II/2001/7 (2001), available at http://www.fao.org/
docrep/meeting/003/x9377e.htm. Since then, more organizations, such as the Western and
Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC), have come into existence.
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1. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea
The fisheries regime is organized within the broad principles of
UNCLOS.' 4 9 This convention created the rules on EEZs, and it allowed na-
tions to use domestic law to conserve marine resources within these
zones.15 While opening the high seas to fishing for all nations,151 UNCLOS
also imposed broad obligations on states to ensure conservation of marine
living resources, including sharks.' The broadest obligations are found in
Part XII, especially Article 192, which imposes an "obligation to protect and
preserve the marine environment."'5 Also relevant is Article 194(5), impos-
ing an obligation on states to protect the habitat of endangered species.
154
Such measures, binding on all states, were needed to avoid the tragedy of
the commons that results from fishing freedoms on the high seas. Despite
these provisions, the oceans continue to be afflicted by all manner of trage-
dies, such as IUU fishing. 155 As such, exploring the avenues for improving
RFMOs has become all the more important.
Most importantly for sharks, the participating states agreed to cooperate
in managing highly migratory and straddling fish stocks. 156 Under Article
237, any specific future international obligation on marine environmental
protection, incurred for instance under a fisheries treaty, must be carried out
consistently with the broader (and vaguer) UNCLOS principles. 5
Despite the relatively open-ended obligations contained in UNCLOS, it
is still an important starting point in solving fisheries problems. In the words
of one observer, UNCLOS "is not perfect" but remains "essential for the
149. UNCLOS, supra note 112. All E.U. countries are members. The United States is
one of the few nonmember states; it is only a signatory. However, the U.S. President stated in
2010 that he would pursue accession. Exec. Order No. 13,547, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,023, § 2(b)(iii)
(July 19, 2010). Regardless, the provisions on protection of the marine environment are wide-
ly accepted as customary international law, including by the United States, and thus UNCLOS
is very much relevant in the discussion on fisheries management. See BIRNIE ET AL., supra
note 8, at 387.
150. UNCLOS, supra note 112, arts. 55-56, 61-62.
151. Id. art. 116.
152. Id. arts. 117-20.
153. Id. art. 192.
154. Id. art 194(5).
155. See Erickson, supra note 27, at 288-89.
156. UNCLOS, supra note 112, arts. 63-64. Technically, in Article 64, the states parties
only agreed to cooperate in managing the highly migratory species in Annex I to the conven-
tion. Id. art. 64. Annex I does include oceanic sharks, along with species such as tuna and
dolphins. Id. annex I. The states parties do cooperate to manage all straddling stocks, that is,
fish stocks that occur in ("straddle") the EEZs of two adjacent states, or a state's EEZ and the
high seas. Id. art. 63.
157. See id. art. 237; Jennifer L. Talhelm, Curbing International Overfishing and the
Need for Widespread Ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 25
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 381, 417 (2000).
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world to begin to solve the overfishing problem." ' UNCLOS by itself is
insufficient, however, as it does not specifically focus on proactive fisheries
management. Since the agreement has not solved the overfishing problem
but continues to favor open-access high seas fishing, it has even been called
a "tool for over exploitation" by some.159
To solve UNCLOS's problems, fisheries management on both the do-
mestic and regional level has been pushed to incorporate emerging concepts
and proactive principles such as sustainable use. These more proactive prin-
ciples are replacing more reactive activity, a model in which fisheries
managers respond only minimally when stakeholders, such as fishermen or
environmental groups, complain of crises. Because the reactive response is
aimed at satisfying particular interest groups and not at ensuring long-term
use of the fisheries resource, this has traditionally allowed overfishing to
occur.16° The concept of sustainable development, geared toward improving
environmental resource management, is taken from the 1992 Rio Declara-
tion and remains "the leading concept of international environmental
policy."16' Over a decade after the signing of UNCLOS, a framework
agreement to manage international fisheries was created that incorporated
these new environmental policy concepts: UNFSA. 
62
2. U.N. Fish Stocks Agreement
The UNFSA further elaborates on the general UNCLOS obligations to
cooperate in the conservation of fish stocks. 163 Because most of the agree-
ment applies to fish that live in the high seas, or partly in the high seas and
partly within national jurisdictions, 64 many of its provisions are highly rele-
158. Talhelm, supra note 157, at 417. Although Talhelm calls for U.S. ratification of
UNCLOS, this is not hugely essential; as far as sharks are concerned, the U.S. ratification of
the UNFSA was probably of much greater significance. After all, the UNFSA is the treaty that
governs how RFMOs operate, and it is the RFMOs that, I argue, should be the primary organi-
zations protecting sharks. See infra Part III.A.2.
159. Erin A. Clancy, The Tragedy of the Global Commons, 5 GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. J.
601, 609 (1998).
160. Kevern L. Cochrane & Serge M. Garcia, Introduction-Fisheries Management, in A
FISHERY MANAGER'S GUIDEBOOK 1, 7-8 (Kevern L. Cochrane & Serge M. Garcia eds., 2009).
161. BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 8, at 53. The incorporation of sustainable development in,
for instance, the CBD has influenced fisheries law, as Article 22 of the CBD states that
UNCLOS and the CBD should be implemented consistently. CBD, supra note 104, art. 22(2).
162. UNFSA, supra note 109.
163. Id. art. 2.
164. Id. art. 3. Only straddling and highly migratory fish stocks "beyond areas of nation-
al jurisdiction" are covered. Id. Since many sharks spend at least part of their life cycle on the
high seas, they fall squarely within UNFSA's provisions. See OCEANA, HIGHLY MIGRATORY
SHARKS NEGLECTED IN ICCAT 1 (2010), available at http://na.oceana.org/sites/default/files/
reports/ICCAT HighlyMigratorySharksEnglish 2.pdf (noting that seventy-two shark
species were listed on UNCLOS Annex I as highly migratory).
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vant to shark conservation. "'65 However, even for stocks within national ju-
risdictions and transboundary stocks (those migrating between EEZs), the
precautionary approach (discussed below) should apply, and national man-
agement should be compatible with international measures. 1
66
First, the UNFSA promulgates several important general principles.
States should optimally manage fish stocks with an aim at long-term sus-
tainable use. 167 Such management should be based on the best scientific
evidence available, 68 but should also be precautionary.169 This idea, called
the precautionary principle, is broadly applicable in environmental law, but
it is particularly important to fisheries conservation. It stands for the propo-
sition that when information is uncertain, states must be more cautious in
managing stocks.'10
Second, the UNFSA firmly establishes the general framework within
which these principles are to be effectuated: the RFMOs. 171 It provides sev-
eral guidelines on how RFMOs should function.'7 2 It also introduces the
important rule that a state's nationals may only fish for a particular high seas
stock if their state is a member of the RFMO managing that stock, or one
that agrees to apply the RFMO's rules. 73 This provision, at the "heart of the
UNFSA,"'174 means that all states fishing for a stock are forced to cooperate
165. See Barker & Schluessel, supra note 34, at 330 (calling the UNFSA part of the
"basic framework ... for managing global shark resources" together with the CBD, CITES,
and CMS).
166. OCEANA, supra note 164; see also BARREIRA, supra note 6, at 14. In that respect,
even though the UNFSA only formally applies to "a fraction of the global fish catch," it does
"raise the threshold" of what is expected of states and RFMOs. KiMBALL, supra note 32, at 25.
167. UNFSA, supra note 109, art. 5(a).
168. Id. art. 5(b).
169. Id. art. 5(c).
170. Id. art. 6. One of the main problems in shark management is the pervasive lack of
data on shark stocks, making this provision extremely important. See infra Part III.C. 1. The
precautionary principle was perhaps most famously stated in the 1992 Rio Declaration. See
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June 3-
14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, princ. 15, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), Annex I (Aug. 12, 1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration]. It is
becoming, or arguably has become, customary international law. See Arie Trouwborst, The
Precautionary Principle in General International Law: Combating the Babylonian Confusion,
16 REV. EUR. CMTY. & INT'L ENVTL. L. 185, 193-95 (2007) (explaining the status of the
precautionary principle and its consequences for states' obligations).
171. UNFSA, supra note 109, art. 8(1).
172. Id. arts. 9-10.
173. Id. art. 8(4). If there is no RFMO for a straddling or highly migratory stock, states
are to cooperate to establish a new one or otherwise ensure management. Id. art. 8(5). As a
matter of basic intemational law, this obligation only applies to the UNFSA member states-
nonmembers are subject to the customary regime from UNCLOS, which preserves freedom of
high seas fishing with only open-ended obligations to cooperate to conserve fish stocks. See
supra notes 151-152 and accompanying text.
174. Gordon R. Munro, The United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement of 1995: History and
Problems of Implementation, 15 MARINE RESOURCEs EcON. 265, 274 (2001).
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in managing it, instead of being free to fish as much of the resource as they
can without constraints. This may avoid some of the problems of a partially
open-access resource, but it also creates some new member and free rider
problems. 175
Third, the UNFSA provides for somewhat stronger enforcement
measures, at least compared to the UNCLOS regime that governed before
the UNFSA entered into force. 17 6 Flag states, port states, and other member
states of the RFMOs are called on to cooperate in improving inspection.177
Much remains to be improved in the field of enforcement, though, 78 and
while the UNFSA provides an important basic framework within which
states can operate, it recognizes that more effective cooperation, manage-
ment, and enforcement can only take place in regional bodies.
179
Thus, on paper at least, the UNFSA has "given international fisheries
law an environmental and inter-generational aspect consistent with the pur-
suit of sustainable development."' 180 However, its structure creates some
problems. Because it encourages participation in RFMOs by any state that
wants to fish for a particular stock, be it a nearby coastal state or a distant-
water fishing nation,' 8' it implicitly creates pressure for overfishing as every
participant will want a share of the resource.8 2 Despite some problems and
criticisms, most notably the failure of RFMOs to properly implement the
UNFSA, the member states have left the provisions of UNFSA intact after
reviewing them in 2006.183
175. See id. at 275-77. See also infra notes 181-182.
176. See KIMBALL, supra note 32, at 27-28.
177. UNFSA, supra note 109, arts. 19-23. Every vessel has to be registered under a
state, which becomes its flag state. The port state is the state where a vessel is docked for any
reason, such as to unload or refuel. Id.
178. See infra Part II.B.3.
179. See UPTON & VITALIS, supra note 132, at 6.
180. BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 8, at 203.
181. Technically, only states with a "real interest in the fisheries," a term left undefined,
may join an RFMO. UNFSA, supra note 109, art. 8(3). Some criteria to take into account
when assessing new members, such as stock status, are laid down in Article 11. See id. art. 11.
This can become a thorny issue, as there is freedom of fishing on the high seas, and it is un-
likely that states simply want to apply the RFMO's conservation measures without having a
say in them. However, it is undesirable to have these states forego cooperation entirely. See
GORDON MUNRO ET AL., FAO, FISHERIES TECHNICAL PAPER 465, THE CONSERVATION AND
MANAGEMENT OF SHARED FISH STOCKS: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS 41-42 (2004).
182. This is almost a reversion to the tragedy of the commons that RFMOs were de-
signed to combat. Game theory predicts that open-membership RFMOs, as under UNFSA
they almost always must be, have much trouble establishing an optimal cooperative outcome.
See Trond Bjorndal, Overview, Roles, and Performance of the North East Atlantic Fisheries
Commission (NEAFC), 33 MARINE POL'Y 685,687 (2009).
183. Andrew Serdy, Accounting for Catch in Internationally Managed Fisheries: What
Role for State Responsibility?, 15 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 23, 23-24 (2010).
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3. U.N. General Assembly Fisheries Resolutions
No discussion of fisheries law would be complete without mentioning
the now annual U.N. General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions on sustainable
fisheries, which are directly related to the UNFSA.' s4 Although UNGA
resolutions are traditionally viewed as soft law, 85 they have at times been
highly influential, including in the fishing context.1 16 The most recent
UNGA sustainable fisheries resolution, like previous resolutions,8 7 men-
tions sharks explicitly in its first section.188 It calls on states to implement
the FAO's IPOA-Sharks instrument, 8 9 and to take "immediate and concert-
ed action" to improve implementation of shark measures in RFMOs and on
the national level.'" Several RFMOs have started taking steps (explored
below), but the UNGA correctly notes that much remains to be done.' 9'
B. A Review of Existing Measures, Problems,
and Possibilities Within Selected RFMOs
No specialized fisheries organization specifically manages sharks in any
ocean. 192 However, several RFMOs that manage other species have increas-
ingly started managing sharks. Four specific RFMOs are highlighted here.
They include ones in which major actors such as the United States and Eu-
ropean Union participate, and together include the organizations that cover
both major oceans.
184. Since the 1990s, the UNGA has passed an annual resolution on the law of the sea,
and since the adoption of the UNFSA, there are now two resolutions: one on the oceans and
law of the sea, and another on sustainable fisheries. The latter is traditionally adopted by con-
sensus. See U.N. Div. of Ocean Affairs & Law of the Sea, Oceans and the Law of the Sea in
the General Assembly of the United Nations: General Assembly Resolutions and Decisions,
UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/general-assembly/general-assembly-
resolutions.htm (last updated Jan. 4, 2012).
185. UNGA resolutions are not legally binding on states. See U.N. Charter art. 10.
186. The most well-known example of a highly influential fisheries resolution is the
moratorium on driftnets, a UNGA resolution that influenced some countries to ban driftnetting
by their nationals. See Christopher J. Carr & Harry N. Schneiber, Dealing with a Resource
Crisis: Regulatory Regimes for Managing the World's Marine Fisheries, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L.J.
45, 65 (2002).
187. As the international community became more aware of shark problems, sharks were
eventually mentioned in the UNGA sustainable fisheries resolution. The first time sharks were
mentioned prominently was in 2004. See G.A. Res, 59/25, 72-74, U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/25
(Nov. 17, 2004).
188. G.A. Res. 65/38, 13-16, U.N. Doc. A/RES/65/38 (Dec. 7, 2010).
189. See FAO, supra note 122.
190. G.A. Res. 65/38, supra note 188, 14.
191. Id. pmbl.
192. Most HMS are not managed by a specific organization. See PACIFIC FMP, supra
note 63, at 4. Tuna is the main exception, which has several RFMOs dedicated to its manage-
ment, and there are also some salmon, halibut, and pollock organizations. BIRNIE ET AL.,
supra note 8, at 740. Other RFMOs manage fisheries generally within their region. Id.
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Two major tuna RFMOs are highly important in shark management, as
sharks are often bycaught, and sometimes even targeted, in tuna fisheries.193
They are the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tu-
na (ICCAT)'94 and the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission
(IATTC). 195 Additionally, two of the regional fisheries commissions, im-
portant because of their geographic scope and history, manage most
fisheries within their geographic regions: the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries
Organization (NAFO) 196 and the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries
Commission (WCPFC). 1
97
Both NAFO and ICCAT operate in the Atlantic Ocean, 98 whereas
IATTC and WCPFC operate in the Pacific.1 99 Together they form the major
institutions that can regulate shark fishing in both oceans. 00 Their ages,
193. OCEANA, supra note 164, at 2.
194. International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, opened for signa-
ture May 14, 1966, 20 U.S.T. 2887, 673 U.N.T.S. 63 [hereinafter ICCAT Convention].
195. The original bilateral Convention for the Establishment of an Inter-American Tropi-
cal Tuna Commission, U.S.-Costa Rica, May 31, 1949, 1 U.S.T. 230, 80 U.N.T.S. 3, was
replaced in 2010 by the multilateral Antigua Convention. See Convention for the Strengthen-
ing of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission Established by the 1949 Convention
Between the United States of America and the Republic of Costa Rica, adopted June 27, 2003,
S. TREATY Doc. No. 109-2, (entered into force Aug. 27, 2010) [hereinafter IATTC Conven-
tion]. The original convention remains in force for the parties who have not ratified the new
convention, and presumably any binding measures promulgated by the IATTC before the
Antigua Convention entered into force remain binding. See IATTC Res. C-03-02 (June 27,
2003). The remainder of this Note will refer to the new convention and relevant IATTC
measures that are listed by the commission as still in force.
196. Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries,
Oct. 24, 1978, S. TREATY Doc. No. 96-20, 1135 U.N.T.S. 369 [hereinafter NAFO Conven-
tion]. Substantial amendments to modernize the convention were adopted in 2007 but have not
yet been ratified. See NAFO General Council, Amendment to the Convention on Future Multi-
lateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, 29th Annual Meeting, Sept. 2007,
NAFO/GC Doc. 07/4 (Sept. 28, 2007), available at http://archive.nafo.int/open/gc/
2007/gcdocO7-04.pdf. For purposes of this Note, the old NAFO convention will be considered
authoritative.
197. Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks
in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, Sept. 5, 2000, 2275 U.N.T.S. 43 [hereinafter
WCPFC Convention].
198. NAFO operates in the waters between Greenland and Canada, and extends eastward
to Greenland and southward to about North Carolina. See NAFO Convention, supra note 196,
art. 1. ICCAT has a much larger geographic scope-it simply applies to "all waters of the
Atlantic Ocean," including seas such as the Mediterranean. ICCAT Convention, supra note
194, art. I. This means that NAFO's and ICCAT's geographic jurisdictions overlap.
199. IATTC operates in the eastern Pacific Ocean, from the American coast to 1500 west
longitude. IATTC Convention, supra note 195, art. III. WCPFC operates in the western Pacific
Ocean, from 150* west longitude to the Asian continent, extending south from western Alaska.
See WCPFC Convention, supra note 197, art. 3(1). This means these conventions are com-
plementary in covering the Pacific.
200. The United States and the European Union are also members of the Convention on
the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), done May 20, 1980, 33
U.S.T. 3476, 1329 U.N.T.S. 47, which is essentially the Antarctic RFMO but, because of its
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structures, and memberships vary, but each have over ten members and in-
clude most of the relevant coastal states and distant-water fishing nations.
NAFO and WCPFC have the power to manage sharks as they would
any other fish stock within their jurisdiction.2"1 The decision-making
bodies" 2 of the tuna conventions have, at the very least, competence to set
regulations for sharks as bycatch species20 3 for both members and cooperat-
ing nonmembers. 2° The practical difference between the tuna and the other
RFMOs is not very significant, as especially ICCAT has interpreted its by-
catch mandate broadly and has included prohibitions on retaining some
species of shark, essentially setting a zero quota for those species. The new
IATTC Convention also gives the power to its commission to conserve all
stocks covered by the convention, including bycaught sharks.
20 5
Under these four RFMOs several steps have already been taken to pro-
tect sharks, though they are generally regarded as insufficient.20 6 Fisheries
limited scope, this one is less relevant to the conservation of the vast majority of sharks than
the RFMOs operating in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. It does have progressive shark man-
agement measures, though, which are discussed infra note 223. NAFO is complemented
geographically by the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC), operating under
the Convention on Future Multilateral Co-Operation in North-East Atlantic Fisheries, con-
cluded Nov. 18, 1980, 1285 U.N.T.S. 129. While NEAFC is also an important body, it is not
part of the survey here.
201. See NAFO Convention, supra note 196, art. 1(4) (stating that the convention applies
to "all fishery resources" of the area except tuna, salmon, marlin, and cetaceans); WCPFC
Convention, supra note 197, arts. 1(f), 2 (stating that the convention's objective is conserving
highly migratory fish stocks, defined as stocks on UNCLOS Annex I, which includes oceanic
sharks).
202. The main decision-making bodies are the commissions, in which all parties are
represented. They make the actual binding decisions on fisheries measures. They have slightly
different names, depending on the convention. See, e.g., NAFO Convention, supra note 196,
art. XI (calling the NAFO body simply the Fisheries Commission); WCPFC Convention, su-
pra note 197, art. 9(1) (calling the WCPFC body a name similar to that of its founding
convention).
203. See ICCAT Convention, supra note 194, art. IV(I) (noting that the commission may
investigate "such other species of fishes exploited in tuna fishing" not covered by another
organization); IATTC Convention, supra note 195, art. I(1) (defining "fish stocks covered by
this Convention" to include "other species of fish taken by vessels fishing for tunas").
204. Cooperating nonmembers are states that apply an RFMO's measures without having
formal membership in the organization. These states formally "agree to apply the conservation
and management measures" of an RFMO. UNFSA, supra note 109, art. 8(4). When they do,
they are generally referred to as cooperating noncontracting parties (CNCPs) or cooperating
nonmembers (CNMs). See, e.g., Recommendation by ICCAT Concerning the Duties of Con-
tracting Parties and Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties, Entities, or Fishing Entities in
Relation to Their Vessels Fishing in the ICCAT Convention Area, ICCAT Recommendation
03-12 (2003) (stating that the obligations of both contracting states and CNCPs to effectively
control their vessels are the same).
205. IATTC Convention, supra note 195, art. VII(c). See infra Part III.C. l.d for a full
overview of the management measures in place.
206. Both environmental NGOs and academics believe that RFMOs need to do much
more to protect sharks. See, e.g., Dustin Cranor, ICCAT Says "I Can't," OCEANA (Nov. 27,
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management works in roughly three steps: gathering information to ensure
decisions are sound and to get feedback on the results of the plan; formulat-
ing management decisions in a plan and adjusting them over time; and
ensuring compliance with, and enforcement of, the measures in place.
207
Shark management, not unlike most fisheries management, has been unsuc-
cessful at every step. The lack of accurate data makes shark management
extremely difficult. And although some management measures do exist, they
are generally weak and ensuring compliance is plagued by problems.
1. The Data Problem
Fisheries management stands or falls by good scientific data. In fact, the
UNFSA emphasizes that management decisions should be based on "the
best scientific data available. 208 However, it is difficult to get accurate as-
sessments of marine life, as the deeper oceanic zones are hard to reach and
ocean life generally has received less scientific attention than terrestrial
life.209 The situation is even worse for sharks, which historically have com-
manded less interest as they were economically less valuable. 10 The first
species-specific assessment of a group of oceanic sharks was completed
only in 2008.211 To make matters worse, the data that states do collect is of-
ten misreported, making management even more difficult.
2 12
The need to collect accurate, species-specific data to legitimize man-
agement measures is almost universally recognized. 213 RFMOs have taken
2010), http://na.oceana.org/en/news-media/press-center/press-releases/iccat-says-i-can-t;
Camhi et al., supra note 29, at 428.
207. See Cochrane & Garcia, supra note 160, at 14-16 (emphasizing the importance of
information, implementation, and a sound plan). The considerations that play a role in formu-
lating a management plan are of course highly complex and involve stakeholder, institutional,
legal, and economic concerns. See id. at 3 (graphically representing the management process
and its many substeps and inputs).
208. UNFSA, supra note 109, art. 5(b).
209. Erickson, supra note 27, at 284.
210. Dulvy et al., supra note 1, at 465; see also Barker & Schluessel, supra note 34, at
325-26 (noting that in 2004, species-level data was almost "non-existent").
211. Dulvy et al., supra note 1, at 465.
212. Such misreporting may include intentional misreporting or failure to report shark
catch-a problem already prominent a decade ago in Asia-or it may be accidental misreport-
ing due to smuggling, which obscures real catch numbers. Edwards, supra note 127, at 325-
28; see also OCEANA, supra note 164, at 2 (noting that in 2008, several countries still failed to
report shark catch under ICCAT).
213. See, e.g., Barker & Schluessel, supra note 34, at 335; CLAUDINE GIBSON ET AL.,
INT'L UNION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF NATURE, THE CONSERVATION OF NORTHEAST AT-
LANTIC CHONDRICHTHYANS: REPORT OF THE IUCN SHARK SPECIALIST GROUP NORTHEAST
ATLANTIC RED LIST WORKSHOP 22 (2008) (noting that a lack of data does not mean manage-
ment should be lacking). The IPOA-Sharks also includes a call for states to collect accurate,
specific data. IPOA-Sharks, supra note 122, 21-22.
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some steps to encourage collection of data on the species-specific level;214
however, over the past years there has been continuing concern over the
quality of the data supply, especially ICCAT's.215 As the WCPFC at its latest




The data we do have about sharks paints a bleak picture: most stocks
"are declining, and none are increasing. '217 Thus, management measures
have become critically important for shark conservation. They include
fishing restrictions such as quotas and gear restrictions, finning bans, and
species protections. 218 RFMOs have the ability to enforce all of these.
Though species-specific protections are more common in the wildlife
214. See, e.g., Recommendation by ICCAT on Atlantic Shortfin Mako Sharks Caught in
Association with ICCAT Fisheries, ICCAT Recommendation 10-06 (2010) (prohibiting reten-
tion of shortfin mako after 2013 unless states provide data on the species).
215. See, e.g., CLEO SMALL, BIRDLIFE INT'L, REGIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT OR-
GANISATIONS: THEIR DUTIES AND PERFORMANCE IN REDUCING BYCATCH OF ALBATROSSES
AND OTHER SPECIES 49 (2005) (noting that ICCAT "scores poorly in terms of bycatch data
collection"); see also N. R. HAREIDE ET AL., EUR. ELASMOBRANCH ASS'N, EUROPEAN SHARK
FISHERIES: A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION INTO FISHERIES, CONVERSION FACTORS, TRADE
PRODUCTS, MARKETS AND MANAGEMENT MEASURES 1 (2007) (stating that ICCAT assessors
themselves noted there was much uncertainty in their data).
216. An optimistic press release stated at the time that "the Commission approved a
shark assessment and research program ... which aims to determine the stock status of key
Commission-managed shark species in the WCPO'" International Fisheries Management
Commission Agrees to Strategy to Amend Measures to End Bigeye Tuna Overfishing, WORLD-
WIRE (Dec. 16, 2010), http://www.world-wire.com/news/1012160001.html. The original
proposal, which details the background of the conservation measure, is available on the
WCPFC website. WCPFC Scientific Committee Sixth Regular Session, Nuku'alofa, Tonga,
Aug. 10-19, 2010, A Proposalfor a Research Plan to Determine the Status of Key Shark Spe-
cies, WCPFC-SC6-2010/EB-WP-01 (2010) (by Shelley Clarke & S.J. Harley), available at
http://www.wcpfc.int/node/2950. The research program creates no new obligations, as it is
nowhere mentioned in the actual shark measure. WCPFC Conservation and Management
Measures [CMM] for Sharks, WCPFC CMM 2010-07 (Dec. 10, 2010) [hereinafter WCPFC
CMM 2010-07]. Unfortunately, the WCPFC has made no progress in shark conservation in
2010, as this measure is nearly an exact replica of its predecessor measure, CMM 2009-04.
See id.; WCPFC CMM 2009-04 (Dec. 11, 2009). Hopefully in 2011, the WCPFC will pro-
gress after the first review of the Shark Research Plan at the Scientific Committee's August
2011 meeting. See Provisional Annotated Agenda, WCPFC Scientific Committee, Seventh
Regular Session, at 7, WCPFC-SC7-2011-03 (May 10, 2011), available at http://www.
wcpfc.int/doc/wcpfc-sc7-2011-03/provisional-annotated-agenda.
217. Camhi et al., supra note 29, at 437.
218. Id. at 420-25.
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conservation context,219 some species-specific shark measures have been
adopted by RFMOs as well,220 in both binding and nonbinding forms.
221
First, some fishing restrictions have been imposed by the various
RFMOs, mostly based on the first comprehensive ICCAT shark recommen-
dation.222 Formal quotas have not been imposed yet, and none of the four
RFMOs surveyed here go as far as completely prohibiting the targeting of
commercially valuable sharks. 223 In 2010, though, ICCAT has prohibited
retention of some specific sharks,224 a measure essentially equal to a zero
quota. All of these species are commercially invaluable and highly threat-
ened.
225
Very few formal gear restrictions are specifically intended to protect
sharks,226 though all of the RFMOs encourage research on, and use of, more
selective gear to minimize shark bycatch.2 27 Another popular fishing re-
219. See id. at 421-22, 424 (showing species-specific measures, mainly under CMS and
CITES; RFMOs only have a species "focus").
220. For (slightly dated) tabular overviews of shark management measures in several
major RFMOs, see id. at 421, 429; see also LACK & SANT, supra note 44, at 25-29.
221. Somewhat paradoxically, ICCAT (as did IATTC before the Antigua Convention
entered into force) issues "resolutions" and "recommendations," with the former being non-
binding and the latter being binding. See Resolution by ICCAT Regarding Consolidation of Its
Resolutions and Recommendations, ICCAT Res. 02-29 (Dec. 4, 2002). NAFO and WCPFC
use nonbinding "resolutions" and binding "conservation and management measures," or
CMMs. See Conservation and Management Measures, and Resolutions, WCPFC,
http://www.wcpfc.int/conservation-and-management-measures (last updated Apr. 19, 2011).
222. Recommendation by ICCAT Concerning the Conservation of Sharks Caught in
Association with Fisheries Managed by ICCAT, ICCAT Recommendation 04-10 (Oct. 2004)
[hereinafter ICCAT Recommendation 04-10]; see Camhi et al., supra note 29, at 421 (noting
that most RFMOs have the "same measures as ICCAT"). ICCAT was also the first RFMO to
note the issue of shark bycatch formally in 1995, then calling for increased cooperation with
the FAO and among RFMOs to improve shark data. See Resolution: Cooperation with FAO to
Study Status of Stocks & Shark By-Catches, ICCAT Res. 95-02 (Dec. 21, 1995).
223. Bycatch is, by its nature, almost unavoidable, but targeted catch may be prohibited,
essentially setting a zero quota. Only the CCAMLR, supra note 200, has done so. See Conser-
vation of Sharks, CCAMLR Conservation Measure 32-18 (2006).
224. Recommendation by ICCAT on the Conservation of Oceanic Whitetip Shark
Caught in Association with Fisheries in the ICCAT Convention Area, 1, ICCAT Recommen-
dation 10-07 (July 2010) (prohibiting retention of oceanic whitetip sharks); Recommendation
by ICCAT on Hammerhead Sharks (Family Sphyrnidae) Caught in Association with Fisheries
Managed by ICCAT, 1, ICCAT Recommendation 10-08 (Aug. 2010) (prohibiting the reten-
tion of hammerhead sharks). Parties should "strongly endeavor" to prohibit targeted fishing
for thresher sharks as well. Recommendation by ICCAT on the Conservation of Thresher
Sharks Caught in Association with Fisheries in the ICCAT Convention Area, 3, ICCAT Rec-
ommendation 09-07 (July 2009) [hereinafter ICCAT Recommendation 09-07].
225. Cranor, supra note 206. Such an approach is highly reminiscent of "deathbed con-
servation." See Kunich, supra note 11, at 550-52.
226. NAFO used to have a mesh size restriction for some targeted shark fisheries, but the
current NAFO regulations do not have that restriction anymore. See BARREIRA, supra note 6,
at 28.
227. ICCAT Recommendation 04-10, supra note 222, 8; Resolution on the Conserva-
tion of Sharks Caught in Association with Fisheries in the Eastern Pacific Ocean, $ 8, IATTC
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striction is the live release of sharks, which is mandated for some species
and encouraged for most.2 28 "Full utilization," which essentially means that
fishermen have to retain most parts of the shark until the first landing, is
present in the measures as well.
229
Area and time restrictions on fishing could protect important shark habi-
tat, and such measures have been imposed to protect other marine life such
as vulnerable corals.231 Considering the importance of critical habitat such
as pupping and nursery grounds, 231 closed areas could be an effective meas-
ure in protecting sharks if those areas can be identified.2 32 Some RFMOs
already protect seamounts, 23 3 which are important shark habitats as well.
2 34
Second, all of the RFMOs have adopted measures to counter finning.
The main measure in place across the board is a so-called fin-to-carcass ra-
tio. This means that although fishermen may cut the fins off sharks, the total
weight of the fins on board may not be more than a set percentage of the
weight of the rest of the shark carcasses present, generally five percent.
235
This is a relatively ineffective measure, as none of the measures specifies
whether live or dressed weight should be the baseline. 236 Moreover, five per-
cent is not an adequate estimate of the average fin-to-carcass ratio at least
Res. C-05-03 (June 2005); NAFO Conservation & Enforcement Measures, art. 17(7), NAFO
FC Doc. 11/1, Serial No. N5876 (Dec. 3, 2010) [hereinafter NAFO CEMs]; Resolution on
Non-Target Fish Species, 1, WCPFC Res. 2005-03 (Dec. 16, 2005) (encouraging minimiz-
ing of bycatch); WCPFC CMM 2010-07, supra note 216, [4 (encouraging research in
techniques such as chemical and magnetic shark deterrents).
228. E.g., ICCAT Recommendation 09-07, supra note 224, 2 (mandating live release of
bigeye threshers); NAFO CEMs, supra note 227, art. 17(6).
229. E.g., ICCAT Recommendation 04-10, supra note 222, 1 2; WCPFC CMM 2010-07,
supra note 216, 6.
230. NAFO CEMs, supra note 227, art. 16.
231. See GIBSON ET AL., supra note 213, at 23.
232. BARREIRA, supra note 6, at 21.
233. See, e.g., NAFO CEMs, supra note 227, art. 15(5).
234. See generally Feodor Litvinov, Fish Visitors to Seamounts: Aggregations of Large
Pelagic Sharks Above Seamounts, in SEAMOUNTS: ECOLOGY, FISHERIES & CONSERVATION 202
(Tony J. Pitcher et al. eds., 2007) (noting that there is a higher concentration of sharks around
seamounts).
235. The ratio is set at five percent by at least all RFMOs surveyed here. Their measures
copy ICCAT, which chose this ratio in Recommendation 04-10. See ICCAT Recommendation
04-10, supra note 222, $ 3. It also left open the possibility of changing this ratio if more in-
formation became available. Id. 1 4. This fin-to-carcass ratio is also used by the European
Union, which has been highly criticized for it. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
236. Live weight is the weight of the entire shark, whereas dressed weight is the weight
of the shark, gutted and with its fins and head cut off. Since a live shark weighs more than a
dressed shark, fin weight as a percentage of body weight is lower when using live weight as a
baseline. Leaving the baseline ambiguous then allows for manipulation of the numbers. See
Safeguarding Sharks: Managing Shark Fisheries and Ending Shark Finning, SHARK ALLI-
ANCE (May 2010), http://www.sharkalliance.org/do-download.asp?did=977.
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for live sharks.23 7 As a result, if a shark's fin weighs in at less than five per-
cent of its total live weight, a vessel can dump carcasses until the ratio is
met, defeating the waste-reducing purpose of the measure. A fins-attached
requirement, such as the one required by the United States and maintained
in its new Shark Conservation Act,238 is generally considered a much more
effective way to ensure shark finning will not occur.
2 39
Third, originally species-specific measures were mostly the province of
the conservation treaties, which operate by listing particular species in their
appendices.240 However, since the 2010 ICCAT Commission meeting,
ICCAT has been getting more involved in shark management on the species
level, rather than simply enacting measures targeted at sharks generally.
241
This is a positive development, as it shows that the organization interprets its
mandate broadly and believes that in principle it can address shark overfish-
ing on a species-specific level. 242 However, no action has yet been taken for
important species that scientists have identified as needing protection by
RFMOs.243
Overall, the promulgation of shark management measures by RFMOs is
a "positive development," but these measures are still a far cry from what
the RFMOs can and should be doing.2" Given both the basic knowledge that
sharks are in bad shape and the lack of full, accurate, and specific data, suc-
cessful management measures should be precautionary in nature.
245
However, this is not what has happened. ICCAT, for instance, has been de-
237. See GIBSON ET AL., supra note 213, at 19 (noting the ambiguity on the baseline was
left in to accommodate differing member state practices); LACK & SANT, supra note 44, at 15
(stating that the ratio has no clear scientific basis, varies widely among shark species, and
depends on cutting techniques).
238. Shark Conservation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-348, sec. 103(a)(I), § 307(1), 124
Stat. 3668, 3670 (2010) (amending the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Man-
agement Act) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1857(l)(P) (2011)).
239. See, e.g., GIBSON ET AL., supra note 213, at 19 ("Most scientists and conservation-
ists agree that the most reliable means for ensuring an end to finning is to prohibit the removal
of shark fins at sea."); LACK & SANT, supra note 44, at 16.
240. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
241. See supra note 224. So far, only ICCAT has binding shark-specific measures. The
RFMOs do all provide species-specific codes for sharks to facilitate data collection. See, e.g.,
NAFO CEMs, supra note 227, annex II. The WCPFC has identified several key shark species
in its shark measure. WCPFC CMM 2010-07, supra note 216, 4.
242. Formally, the commission may only "make recommendations designed to maintain
the populations of tuna and tuna-like fishes ... at levels which will permit the maximum sus-
tainable catch." ICCAT Convention, supra note 194, art. Vm11(l)(a).
243. Principally, shortfin mako and porbeagle have been of concern. See Camhi et al.,
supra note 29, at 430. Especially since the failure of CITES to protect the porbeagle in 2010,
the lack of action in ICCAT is concerning.
244. SMALL, supra note 215, at 50.
245. See Camhi et al., supra note 29, at 437.
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scribed as "extremely unsuccessful at managing bycatch species. ' Since
the management measures of other RFMOs are substantially the same as
ICCAT's, they would probably receive similarly unfavorable reviews. To
make matters worse, this bad management is due not only to the lack of data
and weak management measures, but also to the lack of compliance with
these measures.
3. Enforcement and Compliance
No management measure can be effective without some means of secur-
ing compliance.247  Fisheries compliance is particularly difficult to
achieve, 24 8 and enforcement of and compliance with international environ-
mental norms is difficult to measure. 249 Sharks would benefit from improved
fisheries enforcement, but they are not unique from other fish in that re-
gard. 250  For instance, reduction of IUU fishing, which undermines
conservation measures, is a problem for RFMOs that is relevant to both
sharks and other fish species. 2 1 While it is beyond the scope of this Note to
offer solutions for all fisheries enforcement problems, highlighting some
generally recognized problems provides a useful overview of the situation
sharks are in, and pinpoints areas where RFMOs can improve.
First, it is a general proposition of international law that states cannot
be bound without their consent, and RFMOs are no different from most
international organizations in reflecting this reality. The RFMO founding
treaties therefore either offer an opt-out procedure for parties that do not
wish to implement a particular management measure, or they simply re-
quire unanimity.25 2 Some measures are not binding, or are binding but very
open in nature; in the latter case, states have considerable leeway in their
246. Juan C. Levesque, International Fisheries Agreement: Review of the International
Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas Case Study-Shark Management, 32
MARINE POL'Y 528, 532 (2008).
247. Compliance is used here in a broader sense of norm setting and reinforcement on
the international and domestic levels, instead of in the narrow law-as-force or "enforcement"
sense that critics of international law have used to delegitimize international institutions. See
supra Part II.A. Force is a component of compliance, and it will be discussed here, but it is not
the only one.
248. See Cochrane & Garcia, supra note 160, at 14-15.
249. See BOWMAN ET AL., supra note 98, at 116.
250. BARREIRA, supra note 6, at 55.
251. Id. at 45; ANTHONY COX ET AL., OECD, STRENGTHENING REGIONAL FISHERIES
MANAGEMENT ORGANISATIONS 98, 107 (2009).
252. See, e.g., ICCAT Convention, supra note 194, art. VII(3)(c) (recommendations not
binding on objecting party); IATTC Convention, supra note 195, art. IX(l) (decision making
by consensus); NAFO Convention, supra note 196, art. XII(1) (objection procedure). The
WCPFC procedures are somewhat more complicated, but in principle, decision making is by
consensus. WCPFC Convention, supra note 197, art. 20(1). However, in case of a deadlock, a
vote may be held, and though a member that votes against a measure may have the measure
reviewed, if the measure is not changed, it does become binding. Id. art. 20(6), (8). However,
the important decision of setting quotas has to be made by consensus. Id. art. 10(4).
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implementation of these measures, which makes enforcement difficult and
weakens the conservation scheme.253
Second, although "RFMOs are the engine room of enforcement activity
today on the high seas ' 25 4 enforcement remains a national affair. Where an
RFMO exists, parties are generally expected to implement the organization's
measures into national law, and cooperate with the organization by having
their fisheries enforcement agencies enforce the RFMO's measures. 255 In the
United States, for instance, the Coast Guard primarily provides at-sea en-
forcement.256  However, since at-sea enforcement is costly, domestic
resources to enforce shark management measures may be lacking even in
wealthy states.
25 7
The most important and cost-effective enforcement state remains the
flag state, which has a duty to enforce applicable fisheries measures for ves-
sels flying its flag.25 8 However, flag-state enforcement is not a panacea, as
many states provide flags of convenience. Such states exercise hardly any
control over vessels flying their flag, and most are not members of any of
the fisheries conventions.2 59 A vessel wishing to fish for protected sharks
thus only needs to reflag to a flag of convenience to avoid enforcement of
shark protection measures by its flag state.
260
253. E.g., ICCAT Recommendation 04-10, supra note 222, [ 6, 8-9 (stating that parties
"shall encourage the release of live sharks" and "shall, where possible, undertake research").
Whether research will actually take place is substantially left up to states, which means there
is "no guarantee" such research occurs. See Camhi et al., supra note 29, at 428, 430.
254. UPTON & VITALIS, supra note 132, at 12.
255. See UNFSA, supra note 109, art. 20 (international cooperation in enforcement).
This article is reflected in the RFMO conventions. See, e.g., IATTC Convention, supra note
195, art. XVIII; ICCAT Convention, supra note 194, art. IX(3) ("The Contracting Parties
undertake to collaborate.., to set up a system of international enforcement .... ).
256. See U.S. COAST GUARD, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., OCEAN GUARDIAN: FISH-
ERIES ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIC PLAN app. F (2004), available at http://www.uscg.mil/hq/
cg5/cg53I/LMR.asp. While most of the plan is focused on "force" (boarding and inspections),
the plan also shows some aspects of norm setting and reinforcing: it aims at integrating fisher-
ies norms into the broader strategic plan, and it wants to reinforce international fisheries norms
by encouraging nations to sign the UNFSA. Id. at F-4.
257. Dennis M. King et al., Reassessing the Value of U.S. Coast Guard At-Sea Fishery
Enforcement, 40 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L LAW 350, 355-56 (2009) (showing that detection of a
single violation of fisheries laws by the Coast Guard costs millions of dollars).
258. UNCLOS gave primacy to the flag state, leaving only pollution enforcement to port
and coastal states. UNCLOS, supra note 112, arts. 217, 218, 220. UNFSA still gives a primary
role to flag states, but imposes a stricter obligation to ensure compliance with RFMO
measures in Articles 18 and 19, especially Article 18(1). See Montserrat Gorina-Ysern et al.,
Ocean Governance: A New Ethos Through a World Ocean Public Trust, in DEFYING OCEAN'S
END: AN AGENDA FOR ACTION 197, 205 (Linda K. Glover & Sylvia A. Earle eds., 2004) ("The
flag-State [sic] has extensive duties to comply and to enforce the UNFSA.").
259. Deirdre Warner-Kramer, Control Begins at Home: Tackling Flags of Convenience
and !UU Fishing, 34 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 497, 500-01 (2004); see also UPTON & VI-
TALIS, supra note 132, at 5 (calling them "errant flag states").
260. See Warner-Kramer, supra note 259, at 500-01.
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In response to the weaknesses in flag-state enforcement, port-state re-
sponsibilities have been increased under the UNFSA and in RFMOs. Port
states may regulate and inspect docking vessels for fish caught "in a manner
which undermines the effectiveness of ... conservation measures on the
high seas. 2 61 RFMOs, including ICCAT, have taken measures requiring
their member states to do exactly this, and several also require parties to ban
imports of some fish products caught illegally. 26 2 These measures have been
relatively effective in curbing IUU fishing, 263 but port-state measures specif-
ically for shark protection do not yet exist.
Another way to enforce RFMO measures is boarding and inspection on
the high seas, but this power is generally circumscribed and cannot be exer-
cised against vessels flying the flag of a non-UNFSA state. 21 Coastal state
enforcement in areas under national jurisdiction also remains important, as
most known IUU shark fishing occurs within EEZs,265 and coastal sharks by
definition stay close enough to land to remain within the EEZs. However,
even coastal state management has been inadequate. 26  Although the
UNFSA has mitigated some of the incentives for coastal states to set high
catch limits, the enduring emphasis on sovereignty over the EEZ allows
states to permit continuous overfishing. 267 Even those states that do attempt
to combat shark overfishing and finning face resource problems, like Palau's
single patrol boat to cover its entire EEZ.
268
The FAG has been involved for almost two decades in an attempt to
ameliorate these problems through a mix of soft and hard law, 269 but it
261. UNFSA, supra note 109, art. 23(2)-(3). This is not a treaty power, but a power
grounded in customary law as a corollary to state sovereignty over its ports. See BIRNIE ET
AL., supra note 8, at 744.
262. KIMBALL, supra note 32, at 58-59. See generally Judith Swan, Ocean and Fisheries
Law: Port State Measures to Combat IUU Fishing: International and Regional Developments,
7 SUSTAINABLE DEv. L. & POL'Y 38 (2006) (describing the development of port-state
measures to combat IUU fishing).
263. Warner-Kramer, supra note 259, at 529 ("IUU vessels will find it harder to evade
agreed rules no matter where they are flagged.").
264. UNFSA, supra note 109, art. 21(1); see also BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 8, at 744
("The power to board and detain is hedged about with extensive safeguards, both to prevent
abuse... and to protect the position of the flag state.").
265. CITES, Twenty-Fourth Meeting of the Animals Committee, Apr. 20-24, 2009, Ille-
gal, Unreported and Unregulated Shark Catch: A Review of Current Knowledge and Action, at
6, Doc. No. AC24 Inf. 2 (Apr. 2008) (by M. Lack & G. Sant).
266. See Donna R. Christie, It Don't Come EEZ: The Failure and Future of Coastal State
Fisheries Management, 14 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 4-5 (2004) (noting that "EEZ fisher-
ies management, even by developed nations, has been unsuccessful").
267. Id. at 26.
268. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. The problem of high at-sea enforcement
cost is the same for a coastal state as it is for a state having its boats patrol to enforce RFMO
measures. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
269. Warner-Kramer, supra note 259, at 505.
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has met with mixed success. The ambitious Compliance Agreement,
270
which imposes strict duties on flag states to control their vessels and, under
certain circumstances, to cooperate to ensure the activities of vessels of
nonparty flag states do not undermine the fisheries regime,27 1 did not enter
into force until a decade after its creation. 27 2 The nonbinding Code of Con-
duct for Responsible Fisheries 27 3 and the International Plan of Action to
combat IUU fishing 274 also play a role in curbing illegal fishing, though
whether they have had any real effect has been debated.
27 5
Third, a shark-specific problem in enforcement is that sharks are often
hard to identify on the species level, especially when landed without fins or
heads.276 Fins by themselves are also hard to identify, making fin trade and
mislabeling hard to control. 277 With ICCAT now prohibiting retention of
certain species, it is imperative that these species can be identified correctly
to ensure proper enforcement. To that end, several RFMOs have developed
270. Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Manage-
ment Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas, adopted Nov. 24, 1993, S. TREATY Doc.
No. 130-24, 2221 U.N.T.S. 91 (entered into force Apr. 24, 2003).
271. Id. art. VIII(2). However, parties must cooperate "consistent with ... international
law" when ensuring nonparty vessels' compliance with conservation measures. Id. It thus is a
toothless provision. If the nonparty is a flag of convenience that has not ratified any other
agreement except UNCLOS, other states must respect its flag-state rights, "no matter how
disreputable their activities may be." UPTON & VITALIS, supra note 132, at 6.
272. See UPTON & VITALIS, supra note 132, at 6 ("If the 1993 Agreement is anything to
go by, there is an inverse relationship between treaty requirements and enthusiasm to ac-
cede."). The Compliance Agreement currently has thirty-nine states parties, indicating slowly
growing acceptance of the need to enforce conservation measures, though no new party has
acceded since 2009. See Treaty Status, U.N. TREATY SERIES ONLINE COLLECTION,
http://treaties.un.org/pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=080000028007bela (last visited Feb. 22,
2012).
273. FAO, CODE OF CONDUCT FOR RESPONSIBLE FISHERIES (1995), available at
http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/005/v9878e/v9878e00.htm.
274. IPOA-IUU, supra note 43.
275. UPTON & VITALIS, supra note 132, at 7 ("The hard question is whether anything has
been added by the negotiation of texts which describe the world as regulators would like to see
it rather than the regulatory minimum they have managed to negotiate."). But see Kevern L.
Cochrane & David J. Doulman, The Rising Tide of Fisheries Instruments and the Struggle to
Keep Afloat, 360 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL Soc'Y B 77, 81 (2005) (noting that the IPOA-
IUU shows "substantial national progress in implementation").
276. See LACK & SANT, supra note 44, at 21 (noting that misidentification complicates
data collection); Barker & Schluessel, supra note 34, at 335 ("[T]eeth are key diagnostic fea-
tures for identification.").
277. CUNNINGHAm-DAY, supra note 19, at 132. Genetic testing has advanced to the
point that mislabeled shark products can now be identified genetically, though the procedure is
still expensive and rather cumbersome. See Mahmood S. Shivji et al., Genetic Profiling Re-
veals Illegal International Trade in Fins of the Great White Shark, Carcharodon carcharias, 6




shark identification guides.278 However, difficulties in identification are good
additional reasons for RFMOs to strengthen their finning bans and require
sharks to be landed with their fins and heads attached, 279 a measure that is
also easier to enforce by port states.
C. How to Fix the Gaps: Improving
Shark Protection in RFMOs
Because of these problems, RFMOs have not received glowing reviews,
particularly concerning their management of bycatch, including sharks.
280
As one commentator noted pessimistically about a 2008 conference review-
ing the functioning of the UNFSA: "[The] sentiment that most RFMOs are
not performing their main duty, which is to achieve the long-term sustaina-
bility of fish stocks, prevailed."281 RFMOs must improve their performance
to ensure that sharks-and other fish they regulate, such as tuna282-survive
the twenty-first century. All nations can help solve shark problems and
thereby fulfill their international obligations under the various fisheries trea-
ties by actively promoting the strengthening of RFMOs and taking unilateral
measures to pressure the international community where necessary. The
latter would be especially effective if implemented by one of the major fish
trading actors, most likely the United States or the European Union.
283
278. See Kobe II Bycatch Workshop, Brisbane, Austl., June 23-24, 2010, Kobe I1
Bycatch Workshop Background Paper: Sharks 6 (2010), available at http://www.tuna-
org.org/Documents/Aus[KobeIIBycatchWorkshopPaperSharksFINALENGrev.pdf.
279. Currently, RFMOs allow discarding of the head and use a fin-to-carcass ratio to
combat finning, both of which hamper shark identification. See, e.g., ICCAT Recommendation
04-10, supra note 222, 2, 3 (2004) (not requiring retention of the shark's head as part of
"full utilization" and setting a five percent fin-to-carcass ratio). See also CAMHI ET AL., supra
note 43, at 35 ("Such a [fins-attached] policy simultaneously facilitates species-specific re-
cording of landings... ").
280. Levesque, supra note 246, at 532.
281. BARREIRA, supra note 6, at 16.
282. In July 2011, the IUCN classified several tuna species as "being at serious risk of
extinction," and simultaneously called for stronger RFMO measures to avoid that outcome.
Increased Protection Urgently Needed for Tunas, IUCN (July 7, 2011), http://www.iucn.org/
knowledge/news/?7820.
283. Asian countries, mainly China and Japan, would make a huge impact if they decid-
ed to stop shark finning and trading. This is highly unlikely in the short term, however,
considering the cultural significance of sharks in China and the history of both states in voting
against increased shark protections in CITES. See supra note 47 and accompanying text; Ra-
mos, supra note 120 (noting that at the most recent CITES conference, shark protection
measures voted down by Japan, were supported by other Asian countries).
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1. International Solutions: Strengthening RFMOs, Increasing
Participation, and Combating Perverse Incentives
Because RFMOs are the "engine room of enforcement on the high
seas,' 2 84 they are the most relevant organizations to manage shark fishing.
Beyond RFMOs, nations that are concerned about sharks should certainly
use international law to its fullest extent to protect them, and include work-
ing within the WTO, CITES, and CMS frameworks as important parts of
their management solutions.285
a. Strengthening RFMOs' Structures
Strengthening RFMOs has become a priority in recent years as the
ocean resource crisis has become more pronounced. The Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 2009 published a re-
port surveying several RFMOs and recommending many different ways to
improve them, such as strengthening precautionary measures, encouraging
specific nations to take leadership roles, and increasing participation in fish-
eries treaties. 286 Despite the high costs of delaying action, RFMOs have
traditionally been reluctant to take action until overfishing is actually occur-
ring.287 Encouraging participation in modem, proactive shark management
as the OECD advises should be a key priority for the United States, the Eu-
ropean Union, and all other nations that stand to gain from the continued
survival of sharks.
288
Most of the RFMO conventions discussed in this Note have been mod-
ernized over the last decade, and NAFO will hopefully be modernized
soon. 289 Streamlining the decision-making process and including a dispute
settlement mechanism are important parts of improving the management
process. 290 A two-tiered decision-making system, where not in place, would
be an improvement, for instance. The first tier involves a "push for consen-
sus" that encourages parties to actively participate and reach agreement,
284. UPTON & VITALIS, supra note 132, at 12.
285. See supra Part I.B.
286. Cox ET AL., supra note 251, at 11l-18.
287. id. at 113.
288. See Cochrane & Garcia, supra note 160, at 16 ("The reality [is] that effective, pro-
active planning is still badly neglected in many fisheries around the world.").
289. See Cox ET AL., supra note 251, at 18. The one exception is ICCAT-the RFMO
that, interestingly enough, has been most active in shark management despite its founding
document dating from the 1960s. See id. at 61 (discussing how failures "to agree on conserva-
tion and management measures" have compromised "the sustainability of the reforms that
have been undertaken to date").
290. See id. at 107-09. Dispute settlement provisions are present in the new IATTC Con-
vention. IA'ITC Convention, supra note 195, art. XXV. The modem WCPFC Convention
incorporates UNFSA dispute settlement procedures, and it also provides for procedures when
a party objects to a commission measure. See WCPFC Convention, supra note 197, art. 31;
see also discussion supra note 252.
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while a second tier provides for a majority voting procedure in case no con-
sensus can be reached. 291 This setup ensures that the special interests of one
or two dissenting states cannot block an important conservation measure,
and thereby improves conservation without being offensive to state partici-
pation and sovereignty.
292
b. Increasing Participation in Key Agreements
A major problem for international shark conservation is the lack of uni-
versal participation in key fisheries treaties such as the UNFSA and the FAO
Compliance Agreement. 293 Many commentators note that fisheries manage-
ment can only be effective if all states agree on the basic rules29 4 -yet only
half of the major shark-catching countries are parties to the UNFSA.295 De-
veloping states especially must be encouraged to ratify and actively
implement these agreements.
296
As a shark conservation leader, the United States should also participate
in UNCLOS 297 and the CBD.298 Becoming a member state will allow the
United States to legitimately keep other states to their obligations under the-
se treaties; it could then collaborate with E.U. member states to ensure these
treaties are enforced with respect to sharks.
c. Changing Incentives Through Leadership
Even with good decision-making procedures and all interested states ac-
tively participating, the underlying economic incentives in fisheries remain
291. Cox ET AL., supra note 25 1, at 108-09.
292. Id.; see also UPTON & VITALIS, supra note 132, at 7 (noting that pre-reforrn treaties
usually had "decision-making procedures that can lead to deadlock (and thus inaction)"). The
modem WCPFC has a fallback voting procedure to get out of such deadlocks. WCPFC Con-
vention, supra note 197, art. 20.
293. Cox ET AL., supra note 251, at 1 (showing a table of global and regional fisheries
treaties and the participation in them by major fisheries countries).
294. Id. at 114-15; UPTON & VITALIS, supra note 132, at 13 ("In the absence of a high
level of accession ... we have only a very partial and patchy level of enforcement"). In the
poetic words of one commentator: "In order to save the world's fish stocks, all international
communities must both sign onto conventions that protect the entire ocean and become mem-
bers to the smallest of regional management organizations that protect a specific species."
Erickson, supra note 27, at 287-88.
295. BARREIRA, supra note 6, at 14.
296. UPTON & VITALIS, supra note 132, at 13 ("Sign-up by flag states that have allowed
IUU fishing is not in itself a solution if that fishing persists .... The real goal must be active
support for the suppression of IUU fishing .... ").
297. The U.S. government has indicated its willingness to accede to UNCLOS, though of
course it remains to be seen if that will become a reality. See discussion supra note 149.
298. The United States already has an impressive set of conservation statutes in place,
and so joining the CBD should not be much of a burden: "If anything, the CBD should help
the U.S. coordinate and prioritize its biodiversity agenda even better." William J. Snape III,
Joining the Convention on Biological Diversity: A Legal and Scientific Overview of Why the
United States Must Wake Up, 10 SUSTAINABLE DEv. L. & POL'Y 6, 9 (2010).
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perverse because of subsidies. These incentive problems have impacted in-
ternational fisheries management, 99 leading to delays in action for sharks on
both the domestic and international levels. Some sharks are commercially
valuable, which makes regulation politically unfavorable. 31 In developing
countries, employment in shark fisheries may be valued higher than conser-
vation.301 Fins are still heavily traded in Asian markets,30 2 so Asian countries
especially are less likely to support shark conservation measures. 303 The
ironic "catch-22" is that since most sharks are not valuable outside Asia,
they have historically not received high conservation priority in other parts
of the world.314 So, even sharks without value have fallen prey-as by-
catch-to the perverse incentives that have resulted from subsidized fishing
overcapacity, 3°5 and most states have not paid much attention to them until
recently.
A lack of political will can undermine any regime, 06 and the fisheries
regime is no exception.30 7 Thus, as the OECD report on reforming RFMOs
states, both the functioning of the regimes themselves and the underlying
drivers of action and inaction must be addressed. "Without a change in in-
centives, it is unlikely that mere words on paper will create the political will
necessary to make more fundamental, longer term changes to [ICCAT]. '"308
This holds true for sharks as well, and the United States, the European Un-
ion, and smaller states like Palau should address these problems by
continuing to place sharks on the international agenda and should cooperate
to combat the perverse incentives that lead to overfishing. Leadership mat-
ters in RFMOs, and it is critical that powerful states or groups like the
United States or the European Union assume a leadership role in shark con-
servation by reducing their fisheries subsidies. 3 9 Pushing for the elimination
299. Bilsky, supra note 37, at 611-14; see also Cochrane & Doulman, supra note 275, at
83 (noting some of the general problems with fisheries law, including incentive problems).
300. See Griffin, supra note 35, at 2 (explaining that increasingly, sharks are targeted as
they have become valuable).
301. Barker & Schluessel, supra note 34, at 331.
302. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
303. The best example of the political game involving sharks is the defeat in 2010 of the
CITES porbeagle listing, during which Japan lobbied to "keep fisheries out of CITES." Ra-
mos, supra note 120, at 3.
304. Camhi et al., supra note 29, at 418.
305. See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
306. BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 8, at 86 (noting that the failings of environmental regimes
may be "the product of political choice" and in that respect they are no different from other
international political institutions such as the United Nations).
307. Cox ET AL., supra note 251, at 111 (naming lack of political will first in a list of
problems with RFMOs).
308. Id. at61.
309. It is unlikely any country can work change alone, although the next Section discuss-
es some unilateral measures at the disposal of the powerful, including the United States and
European Union, to enhance international coalition building. Such a coalition is critical to
avoid RFMOs moving too slowly. The United States has already expressed its frustration at
[Vol. 33:383
Save Our Sharks
of fisheries subsidies at the WTO level is equally important, although less
likely to happen in the short term.
310
d. Using and Sharing Best Practices and Management Tools
Where the political will does exist, a "wide array of management tools
and strategies" are available for managing fisheries, as mentioned above.
Some of these tools could be highly effective for conserving sharks specifi-
cally.311 On the individual RFMO level, most commentators agree that
quotas or prohibitions on targeting should be put in place considering the
critical state of most shark stocks, with additional regulations mandating the
use of equipment and gear that minimizes nonquota bycatch.312 For shark
species that may still be caught, measures such as catch documentation
schemes (CDS) have been effective in reducing IUU fishing, and so may be
effective in ensuring that shark catch stays within quota. These schemes can
work in different ways, but they generally operate by certifying that a par-
ticular catch has been caught in accordance with regulations. Sharks or
shark fins without a valid certificate could then lose value and are more easi-
ly recognized as illegal by port states." 3
Other ways to improve monitoring include the use of observers and
electronic vessel monitoring systems (VMS). Observers are entirely inde-
pendent, and go with selected fishing vessels to monitor their activities.
314
RFMOs could mandate the use of observers or VMS on vessels targeting
sharks or vessels that report high shark bycatch. Both VMS and observers
can serve a double purpose by collecting fishing data and ensuring compli-
ance with regulations.31 5 Such a strong combination of enforcement with
ICCAT's slow pace; the United States' historical dominance in the organization is not strong
enough to unilaterally enable change. See id. at 114.
310. See supra notes 138-143 (discussing the slow pace of the current WTO negotia-
tions).
311. Camhi et al., supra note 29, at 419.
312. See, e.g., id. at 420; Griffin, supra note 35, at 2. Catch limits by themselves create
some new problems, though, as high grading (discarding smaller fish) can occur. See LACK &
SANT, supra note 44, at 18.
313. See Stokke & Vidas, supra note 36, at 38. Since CDS is a form of import restriction,
there have been some worries under the WTO regime, but one RFMO, CCAMLR, and the
WTO have been working together to ensure there is no conflict. See id. at 39-40; see also
Zachary Tyler, Saving Fisheries on the High Seas: The Use of Trade Sanctions to Force Com-
pliance with Multilateral Fisheries Agreements, 20 TiR. ENVTL. L.J. 43, 88-89 (2006)
(arguing that RFMO-imposed trade restrictions are likely to pass muster under the WTO
rules).
314. See Read D. Porter, Fisheries Observers as Enforcement Assets: Lessons from the
North Pacific, 34 MARINE POL'Y 583, 584 (2010).
315. See Griffin, supra note 35, at 3 (noting that sharks would benefit from increased
observer coverage). Most RFMOs already have VMS and observer schemes. See, e.g., NAFO
CEMs, supra note 227, arts. 26, 28 (requiring VMS and setting up an observer program, re-
spectively); WCPFC Convention, supra note 197, art. 24(8), 28 (requiring member states to
require VMS and providing a basis for a regional observer program). For the enforcement role
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increased data collection can be a driver for more lasting change within
RFMOs.31 6
Institutionally, specialized shark groups should be created under the
RFMOs' scientific committees to process the data that come out of these
programs and formulate policy advice based on these data. ICCAT, for in-
stance, already has a special shark rapporteur within its scientific
committee, 317 and the WCPFC recently started an elaborate research pro-
gram to determine the stock status of sharks in the WCPFC area.31 The
International Scientific Committee for Tuna-like Species in the North Pacific
Ocean (ISC), which cooperates with the Pacific RFMOs, has recently
formed a shark working group as well.3 19 Having such experts is no guaran-
tee for better management, however, because they can easily be ignored. It
would certainly behoove the states parties to the RFMOs to pay more atten-
tion to their scientific committees and other scientific bodies, which have
flagged shark problems for years.320
On the inter-RFMO level, sharing best practices is also important for
shark conservation.3 21 Many RFMOs have followed ICCAT's lead by adopt-
ing shark management measures that are essentially copied verbatim from
ICCAT's measure,3 22 so especially within this organization a continuing
push for stronger shark conservation is necessary. With RFMOs all using
essentially the same measure, an assessment of its effectiveness and imple-
mentation, and the sharing of those results, could lead to an improvement in
shark management practices. There are already bilateral RFMO memoranda
observers play in U.S. fisheries, see Porter, supra note 314, at 588 ("[O]bservers outside the
North Pacific represent a substantial, but underutilized, enforcement resource.").
316. See Cox ET AL., supra note 251, at 107 ("Further efforts to improve compliance...
(for example, timely reports on observer reports, follow-up actions on penalties, inspections,
VMS hails, etc.) will also help to build on the trust between Parties and facilitate responsive-
ness to future reform challenges.").
317. See discussion supra note 102.
318. WCPFC SCIENTIFIC COMM., COMM'N FOR THE CONSERVATION & MGMT. OF HIGH-
LY MIGRATORY STOCKS IN THE W. & CENT. PAC. OCEAN, SUMMARY REPORT OF THE SIXTH
REGULAR SESSION 80-81 (2011) [hereinafter SIXTH SESSION SUMMARY REPORT]; see also
discussion supra note 216 (explaining the legal status of the program).
319. The shark working group's first papers were published in 2011. See ISCJJ Plenary
Reports and Documents, INT'L SCIENTIFIC COMM. FOR TUNA & TUNA-LIKE SPECIES IN THE N.
PAC. OCEAN, http://isc.ac.affrc.go.jp/reports/isc/iscl 1_reports.html#WG (last updated Sept. 6,
2011).
320. See CAMHI ET AL., supra note 43, at 34.
321. See Cox ET AL., supra note 251, at 108 (noting that dissemination of best practices
can strengthen RFMOs). Best practices could include improved monitoring, enforcement, and
a strengthened finning ban. See id.; Camhi et al., supra note 29, at 438-39.
322. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
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of understanding3 23 that help in disseminating data and practices. The organ-
izations also share blacklists of IUU fishing vessels.324
Perhaps the CMS shark memorandum can become a platform that col-
lects knowledge, shares best practices, and connects institutions. The United
States, which was among the initial signatories of the CMS, can and should
move it in that direction, and with the recent addition of the European Union
and several of its member states, the memorandum should have the political
force behind it to evolve into an important platform.325 Sharks are cosmopol-
itan and occur throughout many nations' EEZs and on the high seas, so it
bears repeating that coordination in management is needed.326 Such coordi-
nation among the otherwise fragmented fisheries institutions could be
achieved through an overarching, focused institution like the shark
memorandum, if a meaningful number of states participate in it, including
distant-water fishing nations and shark-consuming countries.327
2. Unilateral Pressure: Trade, Dispute Settlement,
and Port-State Rights
Concerned nations should use international law to its fullest extent to
promote shark conservation. To the frequent frustration of many, though,
there has traditionally been a "reluctance of the [RFMO] membership to
address pressing problems" '328 in international fora. As mentioned before in
this Note, however, international law offers several ways for states to legiti-
mately exert unilateral pressure on other states to conserve sharks,
especially on those renegade flag states that refuse to control their fishing
vessels.
329
323. See, e.g., WCPFC-IATTC Memorandum, Memorandum of Understanding Between
the Commission for the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in
the Western and Central Pacific Ocean and the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission
(Aug. 27, 2009), available at http://www.wcpfc.int/doc/wcpfc-iattc-memorandum-
understanding. The memorandum provides for reciprocal participation in meetings and
information sharing about stocks.
324. See, e.g., NAFO CEMs, supra note 227, art. 57(6) (sharing NAFO's IUU list with
other Atlantic RFMOs).
325. See Sharks MoU, supra note 102, 9N 6-7 (noting that RFMOs play a critical role and
that cooperation among governments, RFMOs, and other organizations should be enhanced).
326. BARREIRA, supra note 6, at 7 ("Given the wide-ranging distribution of sharks, in-
cluding on the high seas, and the long migration of many species, it is increasingly important
to have international cooperation and coordination.").
327. Stitching together the patchwork of RFMOs is necessary to achieve coordinated
solutions to problems that transcend the individual RFMO, such as sharks, but also IUU fish-
ing. See UPTON & VITALIS, supra note 132, at 13 ("Even with comprehensive accession ...
there remains a question of how a web of regional organizations ... can work together to
bring pressure to bear on a problem that extends to the high seas as a whole.").
328. Cox ET AL., supra note 251, at 114.
329. The problem of flag states not ensuring compliance with conservation measures by
their vessels has been called the "core of the problem facing RFMO enforcement." Tyler, su-
pra note 313, at 81.
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First, the major fish trading states, mainly the United States and E.U.
members, could impose unilateral trade restrictions or incentives. For in-
stance, they could restrict importation of tuna that has not been caught in a
shark-safe way, in other words, caught by vessels from nations that do not
have shark conservation measures such as a finning ban in place. This would
be a restriction analogous to the requirement that foreign nations' fishing
vessels use turtle-excluding devices in shrimp fisheries, a practice that was
upheld as consistent with WTO rules in the U.S.-Shrimp case.33° Such
measures could strike a "hard economic blow to noncompliant states,"33'
especially considering the fact that billions of dollars' worth of tuna is sold
in the United States alone.332 Domestic U.S. law already seems to allow for
imposition of such measures.333 The European Union has the competence to
impose trade measures as well, and could use them to create positive incen-
tives too. For instance, it could grant import tariff cuts to developing
countries that are parties to the relevant RFMOs or the Shark MoU, similar
to its use of tariff cuts for countries ratifying important environmental con-
ventions, such as climate change pacts.334
Second, the UNFSA specifically provides for dispute settlement.3 35 Any
UNFSA member could, if it believes the situation is becoming critical, hail
member states that are blocking key shark conservation measures in front of
an intemational tribunal for violating their obligations under any of the rele-
vant conventions. Perhaps even the broad UNCLOS obligations may be
enough to invoke state responsibility if the relevant court-most likely the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea or the International Court of
Justice-acknowledges that the shark predicament is so dire that action
must be taken.36 Under such a concept of state responsibility, a nation
330. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. So far, trade restrictions that have been
imposed in concert with RFMOs have been upheld: "[N]o case has been brought against any
of the trade measures employed in favor of conserving [a] global fishery resource." UPTON &
VrrALIs, supra note 132, at 11. Sharks seem to be excellent candidates for such measures,
considering their stock status and the slow progress of RFMOs in managing them, both char-
acteristics that were shared by sea turtle bycatch. Whether all the U.S.-Shrimp requirements
for imposition of unilateral measures are met is an open question. See discussion supra note
142.
331. Tyler, supra note 313, at 82.
332. See Fish Watch-U.S. Seafood Facts, supra note 141, at 1.
333. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1826k, 1826j(e)(3). See also discussion supra note 137.
334. See Council Regulation 732/2008, art. 8(1)(a), 2008 O.J. (L 211) 1, 4 (EC), as
amended by Parliament & Council Regulation 512/2011, 2011 O.J. (L 145) 28 (EU) (granting
special tariff preferences to countries ratifying conventions such as CITES, the CBD, and the
Kyoto Protocol).
335. UNFSA, supra note 109, art. 30.
336. Serdy, supra note 183, at 30-31. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
(ITLOS) has already dealt with a fish stock under pressure before: southern bluefin tuna. In
that case, ITLOS enjoined Japan from increased fishing of the stock to prevent further deterio-
ration. Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (Provisional Measures) (N.Z. v. Japan; Austl. v. Japan),
Case Nos. 3 & 4, Order of Aug. 27, 1999, 80, http://www.itlos.org/index.php?id=62.
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might receive reparations as the stocks of a shark species that spends part of
its life cycle in the nation's EEZ are depleted. Because it would have to be
proven that the responsible state was the cause of a particular amount of
depletion, however, calculating damages would be extremely difficult as a
practical matter.337
Third, the United States or E.U. member states, with their developed
naval fleets, could start boarding vessels on the high seas, even of non-
UNFSA states. They could justify this as a countermeasure to a perceived
breach of international law, by arguing that the obligation to cooperate in
managing fish stocks, or at least sharks, has become a customary norm that
is violated by noncooperation.33 8 Given the nature of customary law and the
question of whether the UNFSA's specific fisheries obligations are custom-
ary law, however, such an argument would currently be difficult to make.339
Fourth, a nation could invoke its port-state rights under the UNFSA and
either refuse entry to vessels that have fished for sharks in contravention of
domestic or international conservation measures or impose stringent inspec-
tions on such vessels. 4° ICCAT member states may for instance enforce the
new ICCAT prohibitions on catching certain sharks through port-state in-
spections. A port state could probably also refuse to allow entry for vessels
that have fished for sharks that are unmanaged internationally, like porbea-
gle or spiny dogfish,34 ' if it also imposes such conservation measures on
337. Serdy, supra note 183, at 37.
338. See id. at 26-27.
339. UNCLOS's broad fisheries provisions are almost certainly customary law given the
wide participation in the treaty. The United States, a nonparty, has considered them such since
the treaty was signed. William T. Burke, Fishing in the Bering Sea Donut: Straddling Stocks
and the New International Law of Fisheries, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 285, 292 (1989). However,
since the UNFSA's provisions are more specific and also refer to principles such as precau-
tionary management, it would provide stronger ground to base a countermeasure defense on.
Because the UNFSA forms a framework together with UNCLOS, Agenda 21, and the FAQ
instruments, it has been argued that "the key responsibilities upon which high-seas fishery
management will depend are becoming established in customary international law." D.M.
Johnston, Towards a High-Seas Fisheries Management Regime: Vision and Reality, in 1 DEEP
SEA 2003: CONFERENCE ON THE GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT OF DEEP-SEA FISHERIES
410, 412 (Ross Shotton ed., 2005).
340. UNFSA, supra note 109, art. 23. See also supra notes 261-263 and accompanying
text.
341. Both of these species are considered depleted and in need of conservation
measures, and have been proposed for listing on CITES several times. CAMHI ET AL., supra
note 43, at 37.
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domestic vessels. 34 2 However, unilateral port-state measures are only of lim-
ited effect as they tend to divert rather than solve the problem. 343
Lastly, mobilizing consumer purchasing power to reduce demand for
certain species of fish through, for instance, ecolabeling, might create in-
creased political pressure to force reform in shark management.
344
Governments could promote schemes similar to the dolphin-safe tuna label
that has been effective in the past. 345 Such schemes, however, are somewhat
controversial because the criteria are open ended and complex, and applica-
tion might result in discrimination that is prohibited by the WTO rules.
34 6
CONCLUSIONS
The U.S. Senate version of the Shark Finning Prohibition Act of 2000
contained these words: "[T]he United States ... as a global leader in fisher-
ies conservation and shark management ... should lead efforts ... to
achieve coordinated international management of sharks." '347 While this lan-
guage did not make it into the final bill, one can only hope that a decade
after this statement, the United States and other nations will continue to
push hard on the international level to close the gaps necessary to ensure
protection of sharks. The European Commission has stated that "given its
commitment to sustainable fisheries and its weight at [the] international lev-
el, the Community should assume a leading role in the development of
policies aiming at the rational exploitations of chondrichthyans [which in-
342. A state may not discriminate between its own and foreign vessels in imposing port-
state measures, and it may only impose measures "to promote the effectiveness of subregional,
regional and global conservation and management measures." UNFSA, supra note 109, art.
23(1). Whether unilaterally imposing additional limitations on the catch of sharks could be
"promoting" the effectiveness of open-ended RFMO resolutions that call for minimizing shark
bycatch is unclear.
343. See UPTON & VITALIS, supra note 132, at 9. The past decade has seen increased
efforts at coordinating port-state efforts to control illegal fishing, especially by the FAO. See
DAVID DOULMAN, FAO, FAO PORT STATE MEASURES AGREEMENT: HUMAN RESOURCE DE-
VELOPMENT (2010), available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/FI/brochure/port-state/2010/a1938_e.pdf. In
2009, a port-state measure treaty was adopted by the FAO, which codifies the state's powers to
deny vessels entry to its ports and to inspect vessels in port. Agreement on Port State
Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, FAO
Doc. No. C 2009/LIM/1 I Rev. 1 (adopted Nov. 22, 2009) (not yet in force). At the moment of
this writing, twenty-three states have signed, but only one has ratified the agreement: Norway.
Only two states, Myanmar and Sri Lanka, have indicated willingness to be bound through
accession. See Legal Office: Treaties, Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and
Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, FAO, http://www.fao.org/Legal/
treaties/037s-e.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2012).
344. KIMBALL, supra note 32, at 59 ("There is a special role for consumer initiatives in
promoting accountability. Several recent efforts harness consumer purchasing power to en-
courage sustainable fishery and mariculture practices.").
345. Stokke & Vidas, supra note 36, at 42.
346. Id. at 43; KIMBALL, supra note 32, at 59.
347. S. 2831, 106th Cong. § 2(14) (2000).
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cludes sharks]. 348 This growing enthusiasm for shark conservation is a
hopeful sign.
As the survey in this Note suggests, much remains to be done at all lev-
els to improve fisheries generally. Fisheries management is far from perfect,
and sharks cannot be saved without addressing the larger problems of fisher-
ies regulation.349 Sharks, because they are much more vulnerable than other
fish, require urgent and specialized attention even in the absence of accurate
data. This means the precautionary principle should play a role, and RFMOs
should take strong shark conservation measures despite a lack of data.
35 °
However, as one shark authority notes, "given the depleted global status of
oceanic sharks and declining catch trends ... it may be disingenuous to be
advocating for 'precautionary' management: it is simply too late for that.
For many populations ... aggressive, restorative management is urgently
needed."35'
International law is not the "One True Answer,"'352 but it is certainly one
viable answer among many that should be pursued. A comprehensive inter-
national shark regime that draws on the opportunities contained in both
fisheries and other environmental treaties could contribute positively to
shark conservation. Domestically and within RFMOs, all nations that care
about sharks should encourage a "transition towards sustainable fisheries"
for sharks. 3 This will ultimately require a change in attitudes within socie-
ty and further development of some of the poorer fishing nations, 354 in
addition to the changes within RFMOs suggested by this Note. International
law can help effectuate such a transition, and in turn such changes will rein-
force international rules already in place.
Even if the pace of international reform is slow, states cannot simply
throw up their hands and decry RFMOs as ineffective institutions. There is
much they can do unilaterally as well. Without a strong push for shark con-
servation on every level of management, the slow pace of reform and lax
societal attitudes towards fisheries reform may cause sharks to start going
extinct before the twenty-first century is over. That decidedly "shuts
doors"3 55 on the ability of future generations to enjoy the beauty of sharks,
and may have disastrous effects on marine ecosystems. This dire scenario
must be prevented by the concerted action of all nations.
348. EPOA-Sharks, supra note 91, at 3.
349. Many commentators, NGOs, and some courts continue to denounce the quotas set
by national regulators. See, e.g., Bilsky, supra note 37, at 612 (quoting Natural Res. Def.
Council v. Daley, 209 E3d 747, 749 (D.C. Cir. 2000)); see also Christie, supra note 266, at
10-11 ("Left to their own discretion, however, coastal states have been quite unsuccessful [at
preventing overexploitation].").
350. Camhi et al., supra note 29, at 437.
351. Id.
352. Kunich, supra note 2, at 125.
353. Cochrane & Doulman, supra note 275, at 88.
354. See id.
355. Kunich, supra note 11, at 527.
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